Revisiting the acquittal of 10 policemen: Issues of judicial independence, trial by media and fair trial in Cyprus by S. A. Ebeku, Kaniye
1216-2574 / USD 20.00
© 2010 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA
51, No 1, pp. 1–34 (2010) 
DOI: 10.1556/AJur.51.2010.1.1
KANIYE S. A. EBEKU*
KANIYE S. A. EBEKU
Revisiting the Acquittal of 10 Policemen: 
Issues of Judicial Independence, Trial by Media and Fair 
Trial in Cyprus
Revisiting the Acquittal of 10 Policemen
Abstract. In a recent judgment in the Efstathiou case, the Assize Court of Nicosia, Cyprus, acquitted ten Policemen 
charged with criminal offences related to alleged beating in 2005 of two Cypriot students. That verdict led to 
spontaneous reactions across the country, with people publicly protesting against and criticizing the judiciary. 
Among those that made scathing public comments were the Attorney-General of Cyprus and senior Cypriot 
lawyers. In its judgment, the court had suggested that media comments about the case unduly interfered with the 
fair trial of the case and amounted to contempt of court. On the whole, this case raises the issues of independence 
of the judiciary, trial by media and fair trial. There are two opposing views on the propriety or otherwise of the 
media coverage of the case as well as on whether, and if so, to what extent, the judiciary can be properly criticized. 
Essentially, this article seeks to consider the issues of judicial independence, trial by media and fair trial as well as 
the closely associated issue of contempt of court arising from the Efstathiou case and in relation to the common-
law rooted Cypriot legal system. It argues that the right to fair trial is an inseparable part of a democratic society 
and that while the right to freedom of expression is a fundamental human right and undoubtedly the bulwark of 
a democratic society, it is not realizable without an independent judiciary which is equally indispensable in a 
democratic society. Hence, there is a great need to recognize the limits of the right to freedom of expression in 
order to sustain the independence of the judiciary and ensure the right to a fair trial.
Keywords: Judicial Independence, Trial by Media and Fair Trial, Contempt of Court, Common-law/Commonwealth 
Countries, European Convention of Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus and Cypriot 
Law 
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1. Introduction
On 19 March 2009 the Assize Court of Nicosia, Cyprus, stirred up a hornet’s nest by its 
decision to discharge and acquit the ten policemen accused of various criminal offences in 
the case of Republic v. Efstathiou & Others.1 The criminal charges had emanated from an 
alleged incident of high-handedness and brutality visited on two hapless Cypriot students 
by the accused persons in December 2005. Importantly, the unfortunate incident was 
allegedly captured by a secret video which was repeatedly shown on television programmes 
and published in print and online newspapers before and allegedly during the trial. The 
revulsion of the civil society over the incident was great, and so was a yearning for the 
1 Republic v. Efstathiou & Others (Case No. 17179/06), unreported Judgment of 19 March 2009 
(Assize Court, Nicosia, Cyprus).
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perpetrators to face Cypriot criminal justice. Expectedly, the criminal justice system was 
put in motion against the accused persons and this ran into full course on 19 March 2009 
with the verdict of the trial court (the Assize Court of Nicosia). 
Going by media accounts of the incident, including the video footage, the accused 
persons were ‘guilty as charged’. However, the three-member panel of judges that heard the 
case thought and decided otherwise; as earlier mentioned, they found the accused persons 
‘not guilty as charged’ and accordingly set them free. This led to public outrage and 
spontaneous popular street protests against the Cypriot judiciary for what was considered to 
be an unjust decision.2 The next day and on several occasions subsequently, local newspapers 
were awash with various reactions to the judicial verdict–mostly critical of the decision (see 
below). Surely, this may well be excused going by the general public sentiment against that 
incident, though this is not to suggest that it was entirely proper. It may well be that the 
trial judges were wrong in their decision on the case. However, this is to be ultimately 
decided locally by the appeal court–the Supreme Court of Cyprus.3 Even so, there is no 
guarantee that the Supreme Court would necessarily satisfy the public’s sense of justice.4 
In the end, although the decision may rightly be criticized in the future for being 
erroneous in point of law (in the interim, it is sufﬁ cient to say that there are some difﬁ culties 
in understanding the general approach and reasoning of the judges in relation to the merits 
of the case), it is important to consider, at this stage, the crucial issues raised by the various 
protests in relation to the working of the legal system. As will become clear below, the 
decision and various reactions thereto, have raised issues of independence of the judiciary, 
trial by media and fair trial. This article seeks to consider these issues here together with the 
closely related issue of contempt of court. As a point of departure, section 2 of this article 
will provide the background and context by outlining some of the reactions to the judicial 
2 Public protests against the decision continued for several days and weeks. See Hazou, E.: Lat-
est protests over police acquittal “We are not doing this for our own kids, but rather for the children of 
other families who might get the same treatment”. [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 24 March 2009]; 
Theodoulou, J.: Police beating appeal court date set for September. [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 
28 April 2009]. Note that all references here to articles published in the (CyprusMail Internet Edition) 
are permanently searchable through its website: <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/>.
3 The Supreme Court set down 14–18 September 2009 for the hearing of the appeal ﬁ led by 
the prosecution. See Theodoulou: Police beating appeal… op. cit. However, it had to hear ﬁ rst a pre-
liminary objection ﬁ led by counsel for the ﬁ rst respondent in the appeal seeking to dismiss the ap-
peal in limine for abuse of judicial process in that the Attorney-General had issued public statements 
declaring lack of conﬁ dence in the Cypriot judiciary after the decision of the trial court in the case. 
Although the application was found to be almost on all fours with the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Constantinides v. Vima Ltd., Cyprus Law Reports, (1983) 348, the court was able to distinguish it, 
inter alia, on the ground that the Attorney-General was not a party ‘stricto sensu’ in the present appeal 
and accordingly dismissed the objection. The court frowned at the impugned statements, suggesting 
that they were contemptuous. However, that was not the question before them (only the ‘contemnor’ 
Attorney-General had the power to bring such contempt proceedings before the court). See Attorney-
General of the Republic v. Efstathiou (Criminal Appeal No. 56/2009), unreported Ruling (in Greek) 
of 8 October 2009 (Supreme Court of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus). As at 22 March 2010 the appeal was 
still pending.
4 After exhausting the local remedies, the victims might further seek redress from the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg if they are unsatisﬁ ed with the outcome. In this regard, 
they would be suing the State for the violation of their human rights. However the accused persons, 
once acquitted by the Supreme Court, cannot be retried by the ECHR.
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verdict. This will be followed in section 3 by an analysis of the focal issues in the context of 
the Cypriot common-law rooted legal system,5 as inﬂ uenced or modiﬁ ed by it’s member-
ship of the Council of Europe as well as the European Union. The last section, section 4, 
will be devoted to concluding remarks. It is hoped that this article will generate a lively 
debate, especially within the legal community in the country, which could lead to better 
appreciation of the working of the legal system by the general society and, perhaps, any 
necessary changes in the extant law.
2. Public Reactions: Background and Context
Media reports of reactions to the recent judicial verdict in the Efstathiou case show that 
they cut across the whole strata of the Cypriot society. Apart from the general public, there 
were also reactions from President Demetris Christoﬁ as of the Republic of Cyprus, senior 
Cypriot lawyers, professional associations (particularly the Cyprus Bar Association), and 
the Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus Petros Clerides. Furthermore, there was 
also a counter-reaction by the Supreme Court of Cyprus. For present purposes, some of 
those reactions–particularly those mentioned here–are brieﬂ y recounted hereunder.
It needs to be made clear from the outset that the present concern of this article is not 
with the merits of the court’s decision. In other words, the article is not concerned with the 
question whether or not that decision was wrong. This could come in the future. Positively 
stated, this article is concerned with the propriety of the various reactions to the judicial 
verdict in the Efstathiou case–especially the reactions of the Attorney-General of the 
Republic of Cyprus, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, members of the legal 
profession in Cyprus (lawyers), and the Supreme Court of Cyprus. More speciﬁ cally, this 
article is concerned with some of the issues raised by the various reactions as adumbrated 
above. 
From available sources, the Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus (the Chief 
Legal Ofﬁ cer of the State of Cyprus6) was so furious about the verdict that he attempted 
to interrupt the judges while reading their judgment, but was refused.7 Thereafter, he issued 
a press statement condemning the verdict thus: ‘The Criminal Court’s decision is wrong, 
from start to ﬁ nish, and unfortunately it has harmed the prestige of the judicial system 
irreversibly… We can’t always trust court decisions; each civilian has the right to judge 
them for themselves.’8 He rejected the reasoning of the judges that the media’s projection of 
the case amounted to trial by media and affected the rights of the accused persons to fair-
hearing: ‘In such a matter of importance and public interest, don’t the media have the 
right to show scenes and make comments? ... The media did their jobs well and not only did 
they have the right, they had an obligation to inform the public’.9 He also appeared on 
5 In Constantinides v. Vima Ltd [at p. 355], the Supreme Court of Cyprus noted that ‘[t]he ad-
ministration of justice in Cyprus is modelled on the administration of justice under the common law 
judicial system…’ 
    6 The ofﬁ ce of the Attorney-General is one of the independent ofﬁ ces established under Part 
6 of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960. Holders of the ofﬁ ce enjoy security of tenure as a judge of the 
High court.
    7 Theodoulou, J.: AG: Court decision wrong from start to ﬁ nish [CyprusMail (Internet Edi-
tion), 21 March 2009]. 
    8 Ibid.
    9 Ibid.
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television programme, condemning the judicial verdict in very strong terms.10 A former 
Deputy Attorney-General of Cyprus and former Cypriot Judge of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Loukis Loucaides, agreed with the position of the Attorney-General. He also 
launched a serious attack on the judges thus: ‘There is something wrong with the way the 
judges approached the evidence. They may be not sufﬁ ciently trained…’.11 Moreover, with 
a seeming tang of incontrovertible authority, he declared: ‘The media inﬂ uence is irrelevant 
to the proceedings, yet the court went out of its way to touch on the matter. ECHR [European 
Court of Human Rights] case law is clear on this. In the cases of professional judges (with 
no jury), the issue of media inﬂ uence does not arise’.12
On his part, the President of the Republic of Cyprus expressed surprise at the decision, 
stating that it was a ‘provocation to the sense of justice of every citizen of the Republic’.13 
Importantly, he also expressed his respect for the independence of the judiciary. 
Further reactions, as indicated above, came from members of the legal profession and 
the Supreme Court. Speaking on behalf of the Cyprus Bar Association, its President, Doros 
Ioannides, cautioned against making public statements ‘when a decision is under appeal’.14 He 
insisted on the need to respect the integrity of the courts, arguing: ‘Statements and counter-
state ments … will not help justice. Cyprus justice has helped this country and under no circum-
stances should we try to diminish its role’.15 On the contrary, the President of the Limassol Bar 
Association (Limassol Branch of the Cyprus Bar Association), Christos Melides, argues that 
lawyers, the general public and the media ‘have the right to criticize the decision and make 
statements on the subject’;16 for him, this is part of the freedom of expression or the right to 
free speech.17 It should be mentioned that on this position he is in tandem with a large sec tion 
of the Cypriot society, including (particularly) the gentlemen of the press.
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Cyprus–reacting directly to the caustic public ‘criticisms’ 
of the Assize Court judges and the Cypriot judiciary by the Attorney-General–said in a public 
statement that it was shocked and discontented with the ‘inappropriate statements of the 
Attorney-General to the media’.18 The statement continued: ‘The Attorney-General should 
be better aware of the fact that if he disagrees with a decision, the legal means he has at his 
disposal is to appeal, and not attack the courts and justice system through television… The 
Supreme Court condemns without reservations the televised attempts to diminish the 
prestige of the judicial system…’.19
10 See: What sort of example are our justice ofﬁ cials setting? [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 27 
March 2009] See also the view of Hazou, E. contained in Pissa, M.: Banana republic – rejoice in your 
justice system [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 20 March 2009]. 
11 See Evripidou, S.: Former European Court of Human Rights Judge says cops acquittal “stu-
pid and absurd” [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 22 March 2009].
12 Ibid (emphasis added).
13 See Theodoulou: AG: Court decision… op. cit. 
14 Theodoulou, J.: Black page in the history of Cypriot justice. [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 
21 March 2009], 
15 Ibid.
16 Hassapi, A.: Limassol Bar Association speaks out against court decision acquitting police of-
ﬁ cers [CyprusMail (Internet Edition, 25 March 2009].
17 Ibid.
18 Theodoulou: AG: Court decision… op. cit. See also Theodoulou:  Black page in the history… 
op. cit. 
19 Ibid. 
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Interestingly, the recent development in Cyprus recalls similar incidents around the 
world: riots following acquittal on criminal charges. Two examples will sufﬁ ce to illustrate 
this point. First, in 1992 the acquittal of the four policemen charged in California v. Powell 
et al. with the beating of Rodney King ‘unleashed the rage of many in L.A. [Los Angeles]’;20 
it caused terrible rioting. In a cruel coincidence, that incident, like the recent one in Cyprus, 
was caught on video when it occurred in 1991. The second example is Jessica Lal case that 
caused serious protests and riots in India in 1998. In fact, such was the impact of the riots 
that the government of India was forced to order a retrial of the case.21 Importantly, both of 
these incidents, like the present Efstathiou case in Cyprus, raised the questions of trial by 
media and fair trial.
3. Analysis/Critique
From all the foregoing public reactions, it is clear that issues of judicial independence, trial 
by media and fair trial have been raised, among others. This article will attempt to brieﬂ y 
address the speciﬁ cally mentioned issues here. For convenience and clarity, these issues 
will be addressed in two sub-sections. The ﬁ rst sub-section will address the issue of 
independence of the judiciary while the succeeding sub-section will deal with the issue of 
trial by media and fair trial as well as the closely related issue of contempt of court.
3. 1. Independence of the Judiciary22
Judges individually shall be free, and it shall be their duty, to decide matters before 
them impartially, in accordance with their assessment of the facts and their 
understanding of the law without any restrictions, inﬂ uences, inducements, pressures, 
threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.23
20 Cannon, L.: Rodney King’s Legacy. <http://www.courttv.com/archive/caseﬁ les/rodneyking/> 
(accessed 27 April 2009). 
21 Samanta, N.: Trial by Media – Jessica Lal Case. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003644> (ac-
cessed 22 April 2009).
22 There is a large body of literature on the concept of independence of the judiciary in re-
lation to both national and international-regional courts and tribunals. See, by example, Bradley, 
A.W.–Ewing, K. D.: Constitutional and Administrative Law, 14th ed. Essex 2007, 388–395; Kirby, 
M.: A global approach to judicial independence and integrity, University of Queensland Law Jour-
nal 21/2 (2001) 147–159; Larkins, C. M.: Judicial independence and Democratization, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 44 (1996) 605–626; Mackenzie, R.–Sands, P.: International courts and 
tribunals and the independence of the international judge. Harvard International Law Journal, 44 
(2003) 271–285; Olbourne, B.: Independence and Impartiality: International Standards for National 
Judges and Courts. The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2 (2003) 97–126; 
Claus, L.: Constitutional Guarantees of the Judiciary: Juris diction, Tenure, and Beyond. American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 64 (2006) 459–483; Lord Hope of Craighead: Judicial Independence. 
Scots Law Times, 13 (2003) 105–111; Plaxton, M.: The Neutrality Thesis and the Rothstein Hear-
ing. University of New Brunswick Law Journal, 58 (2008) 92–104.
23 Article 2:02 of the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (the ‘Montreal Dec-
laration’); quoted in Olowofoyeku, A. A.: Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity. Oxford, 1993, 
1. The author explained the importance of this international instrument thus: ‘The declaration was 
adopted at the ﬁ rst plenary session of the 1st World Conference on the Independence of Justice which 
was held at Montreal on 10 June 1983. It was [and still is] a universal statement of principle. It stated 
the independence which “national judges” ought to enjoy.’ Ibid. More recently, Article 1 of the Uni-
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As a concept, independence of the judiciary (or judicial independence) is well-
understood in most, if not all, parts of the world and has been deﬁ ned or described by 
various authors24 as well as in various national and international instruments, including the 
UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 1985,25 the Latimer House 
Guidelines on Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Independence 1998, and the Cairo 
Declaration on Judicial independence 2003. For present purposes, it is sufﬁ cient to refer to 
only two descriptions/deﬁ nitions of the concept. According to Chris Maina Peter:
Independence of the judiciary means [that] every judge or magistrate, as the case may 
be, is free to decide matters brought before him in accordance with his assessment of 
the facts and his understanding of the law without any improper inﬂ uence, inducements, 
or pressures direct or indirect from any quarter or for any reason. There is a tendency 
of thinking that independence of the judiciary means just independence from the 
legislature and executive. In reality it means more than that. It also means independence 
from political inﬂ uence whether exerted by the political organ of the State, or by 
political parties, or the general public…26 (emphasis added).
Importantly, the above statement echoes the provision of Article 2 of the UN Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 1985, which states that ‘the judiciary shall 
decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the 
law, without any restrictions, improper inﬂ uences, inducements, pressures, threats or 
interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason’. Based on this, it is 
important to underline that judicial decisions are based on facts placed before the court and 
the extant law (lex lata), and not on de lege ferenda (the law as it ought to be).
versal Charter of the Judge 1999 provides that ‘the independence of the judge is indispensable to 
impartial justice under the law. It is indivisible. All institutions and authorities, whether national or 
international, must respect, protect and defend that independence’. More importantly, Article 2 thereof 
provides, inter alia, that ‘…The Judge, as a holder of judicial ofﬁ ce, must be able to exercise judicial 
powers free from social, economic and political pressure…’ The Charter was adopted at the meeting 
of the Central Council of the International Association of Judges in Taipei (Taiwan) on 17 Novem-
ber 1999. See further Recommendation No. R (94) 12 (on the independence, efﬁ ciency and role of 
Judges)–adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 13 October 1994, esp. 
Principle 1; European Charter on the Statute for Judges (adopted at a multilateral meeting held 8–10 
July 1998 in Strasbourg, under the auspices of the Council of Europe).
24 See Canivet, G.–Andenas, M.–Fairgrieve, D. (eds.): Independence, Accountability, and the 
Judiciary. London, 2006.
25 Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General As-
sembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. 
26 Peter, C. M.: Independence of the Judiciary in Tanzania: Many Rivers to Cross. In: Jjuuko, 
W. F. (ed.): The Independence of the Judiciary and the Rule of Law: Strengthening Constitutional 
Activism in East Africa. Kampala, 2005, 58. See also the speech of the Chief Justice of South Af-
rica, Mohamed C. J.: The Role of the Judiciary in a Constitu tional State, South Africa Law Journal, 
(1998) 111, at 112–113: ‘What judicial independence means in principle is simply the right and 
the duty of judges to perform the function of judicial adjudication, through an application of their 
own integrity and the law, without any actual or perceived, direct or indirect interference from or 
dependence on any other person or institution…’ The speech was given at the occasion of the ﬁ rst 
orientation course for newly appointed judges in South Africa.
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In summary, one can say that independence of the judiciary essentially requires that 
judges should be free to decide cases brought before them without fear of any reprisal 
against them. This ensures that they dispense justice fairly, impartially and without fear or 
favour. To be sure, the impartial dispensation of justice is in the interest of the society in 
general. As the Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (KSICJ) explains, 
‘the judiciary is the guardian of the rights of man and it protects the rights from all 
possibilities of individual and public encroachments’.27 (One critical question raised in the 
recent Cypriot case under consideration here is whether the judiciary has failed in its 
constitutional role, but this is beyond the scope of the present article). This is why most, if 
not all countries of the world, institute constitu tional, statutory and other measures to ensure 
the independence of the judiciary, including the concept of judicial immunity which 
insulates judges from legal (civil and criminal) actions based on what they said or did in the 
course of judicial proceedings. At the international level, Article 2: 24 of the Universal 
Declaration on the Independence of Justice (the ‘Montreal Declaration’) 1983 provides that 
‘Judges shall enjoy immunity from suit, or harassment, for acts and omissions in their 
ofﬁ cial capacity’. Furthermore, the 1985 UN instrument on the independence of the judiciary 
enjoins States to guarantee the independence of the judiciary and enshrine it in the 
Constitution or the law of the country.28 On the aspect of judicial immunity at the national 
level, Olowofoyeku has explained the general position in the common-law world as 
follows:29 
Judges are not free from error and some do not always take good care. The errors or 
lack of due care may, if and when they occur, have disastrous consequences for a 
litigant. The problem is the correct course of action when such a situation occurs. 
Various legal systems have developed their own ways of coping with the problem. The 
common-law world [including Cyprus] has generally adopted a rather benign approach 
than stoning the judges–it has shrouded them in an almost impregnable protective 
cloak. A judge could go to sleep during trial, spend four years in reaching a decision, 
be slanderous, and yet anyone aggrieved by his behaviour will usually have no 
recourse. This is known as absolute immunity.30
This is consistent with the exposition of Lord Denning in his speech in Sirros v. 
Moore,31 thus: 
Ever since the year 1613, if not before, it has been accepted in our law that no action is 
maintainable against a judge for anything said or done by him in the exercise of a 
jurisdiction which belongs to him. The words which he speaks are protected by an 
27 Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Best Practice Guide for Judicial 
Independence. Nairobi, 2007.
28 Article 1.
29 Olowofoyeku: op. cit. 2. 
30 The author referred to relevant material drawn from common-law countries such as the U.K, 
U.S., New Zealand and Nigeria. Note that this author believes that the common law position needs 
reconsideration, especially in contemporary times. See Olowofoyeku, A. A.: Accountability versus 
Independence: The Impact of Judicial Immunity. In: Canivet–Andenas–Fairgrieve (eds.): op. cit. 357, 
esp. at 383.
31 Sirros v. Moore [1975] Queen’s Bench, 118. Note that the common law position re-stated by 
Lord Denning is reinforced by section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 which absolves the 
Crown of any liability for any person discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
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absolute privilege. The orders which he gives, and the sentences which he imposes, 
cannot be made the subject of civil pro ceedings against him. No matter that the judge 
was under some gross error or ignorance, or was actuated by envy, hatred and malice, 
and all uncharitable ness, he is not liable to an action. The remedy of the party aggrieved 
is to appeal to a Court of Appeal or to apply for habeas corpus, or a writ of error or 
certiorari, or take some such step to reverse his ruling… The reason is not because the 
judge has any privilege to make mistakes or to do wrong. It is so that he should be able 
to do his duty with complete independence and free from fear. It was well stated by 
Lord Tenterden C.J. in Garnett v. Ferrand (1827) 6 B. & C. 611, 625: “This freedom 
from action and question at the suit of an individual is given by the law to the judges, 
not so much for their own sake as for the sake of the public, and for the advancement 
of justice, that being free from actions, they may be free in thought and independent in 
judgment, as all who are to administer justice ought to be”.32
With speciﬁ c regard to Cyprus, it is important to note that the principle of judicial 
immunity is given expression in Articles 133(10) and 154(10) of the Constitution of Cyprus 
1960 which provides that no action shall be brought against the President of the Supreme 
Court or the High Court or any other judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court for any 
act done or words spoken in his judicial capacity. The independence of the Cypriot judiciary 
is further guaranteed by other means, including: (1) the mode of appointment (designed 
to prevent executive or other institutional inﬂ uence33); (2) security of salary (a judge’s 
remuneration cannot be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment34 and constitutes a 
charge on the consolidated fund35); (3) security of tenure (once appointed, a judge cannot 
be removed until he/she attains the retirement age of 68 years, except for misconduct 
determined by an independent Council established under the Constitution36). In fact, in a 
recent report on the state of human rights in Cyprus it was acknowledged that the Cypriot 
judiciary is independent.37
It is important to emphasize that the judicial immunity enjoyed by judges ‘applies to 
both civil and criminal liability, and protests judges in respect of acts of a judicial nature’.38 
While the principle of judicial immunity do not purport to insulate judges against public 
32 Sirros v. Moore [at p. 132]. See also Fray v. Blackburn (1863) 122 ER 217, where Crompton 
J. said: ‘It is a principle of our law that no action will lie against a judge of one of the superior courts 
[as well as inferior courts and persons presiding over quasi-judicial bodies] for a judicial act, though 
it be alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly…The public are deeply interested in this 
rule, which, indeed exists for their beneﬁ t, and was established in order to secure the independence of 
judges’. See further Scott v. Stansﬁ eld (1868) LR 3 Ex 220, 223 per Kelly CB. 
33 See generally Constitution of Cyprus, Articles 133 and 153.
34 Articles 133(12) and 153(12).
35 Article 166(1)(b).
36 See Constitution of Cyprus, Articles 133(7) & (8) and 153(7) & (8). The retirement age of 
ﬁ rst instance judges is 63 years. See Courts of Justice Law 14/60 (as amended), section 8(2). See also 
Constitution of Cyprus, Article 158(3).
37 US Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Cyprus (Washington, DC 2009) sec-
tion 1(e), <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119074.htm> (accessed 23 April 2009).
38 Olowofoyeku: op. cit. 77. However, with regard to criminal liability, the immunity is not 
absolute. See Ibid. 76.
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criticisms,39 it is contended that certain kinds of public criticism–especially by certain 
responsible and highly-placed persons in the society (such as high ofﬁ cers of government 
and lawyers)–could amount to intimidation or political pressure and, more seriously, have 
the capacity to instill fear in judges40 apart from their potential to undermine public 
conﬁ dence in the judiciary and/or lower the integrity and prestige of the courts in the eyes 
of the people. When this happens, the hallowed independence of the judiciary (or 
‘independence of justice’, as the 1983 Montreal Declaration calls it)41 is compromised, to 
the detriment of the judicial system and the society in general. This appears to be the present 
situation in Cyprus as a result of the high-proﬁ le criticisms of the judiciary by the President 
of the Republic of Cyprus, the Attorney-General of the Republic Cyprus and senior Cypriot 
lawyers, inter alia, following the decision of the Nicosia Assize Court to acquit the ten 
policemen charged with assaulting two young Cypriot students.42
In Britain, the need to preserve and protect the independence of the judiciary explains 
the existence of the British constitutional convention which forbids members of Parliament 
from asking Ministers questions which border on the criticism of judges in the Parliament.43 
This is also why British Ministers generally refrain from criticizing judges publicly, though 
instances of such criticisms can be pointed to.44 It is possible that the President of the 
Cyprus Bar Association had this approach in mind when he issued the statement earlier 
stated above. Arguably, the British approach reﬂ ects the acceptable approach in the Republic 
of Cyprus as it is consistent with the general approach within the commonwealth. Viewed 
this way, it is submitted that the reaction of the Attorney-General of Cyprus (as brieﬂ y 
stated above) was unrestrained, precipitate, and against the spirit of independence of the 
judiciary, and probably unprofessional. Similar comments could apply to the reaction of the 
President of the Republic, but it is important to note that he recognized that his criticism 
might impinge on the independence of the judiciary and declared his respect for it. 
Importantly, the President’s recogni tion of the independence of the judiciary is in line with 
Article 2: 04 of the 1983 Montreal Declaration which states that ‘the judiciary shall be 
independent of the executive and the legislature’. 
All in all, there is no gain-saying that the independence of the judiciary is important 
and indispensable in all democratic countries. In this context, Olowofoyeku has rightly 
stated: 
39 See The Role of the Judge in Contemporary Society, United Nations Crime and Justice Re-
search Institute (UNICRI) Publication No 24, 1984, where it was stated: ‘Independence does not, 
however, mean absence of responsibility for his own actions. The concept which regards the judge as 
unrestrained by law (legibus solitus) would end, sooner or later, in protecting not so much his neces-
sary freedom, as the arbitrariness of his decisions’. Ibid. 20.
40 Bradley and Ewing note that ‘judicial independence requires that judges should be protected 
from political pressure to reach decisions which suit the government or other powerful interests’ See 
Bradley–Ewing: op. cit. 390.
41 For a recent and interesting discussions and debate on the independence of the judiciary in 
some parts of the world, see Canivet–Andenas–Fairgrieve (eds.): op. cit.
42 Compare Addo, M. K.: Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of Judges: A Comparative 
Study of European Legal Standards. Dartmouth, 2000; Comella, F.: Freedom of Expression in Politi-
cal Contexts: Some Reﬂ ections on the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights. In: Wo-
jciech Sadurski (ed.): Political Rights Under Stress in 21st Century Europe. Oxford, 2006, 116.
43 See Barnett, H.: Constitutional & Administrative Law., 7th ed. Oxford, 2009, 388.
44 See Bradley–Ewing: op. cit. 390–391.
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In a publication released jointly by the International Association of Judges and the 
United Nations Social Defence Research Institution,45 judicial independence was seen 
as an essential prerequisite for guaranteeing all the basic rights and freedoms 
acknowledged by modern civilized society. As such, the legal system [of all countries 
of the world, especially common law countries such as Cyprus] must protect such 
independence against any encroachment by other powers, and must clearly provide the 
means to defend the judge against all abuses and pressures from individuals or 
groups.46
The next question is whether the Supreme Court of Cyprus was right to issue a public 
response to the reaction of the Attorney-General. This is not an easy question which could 
be answered simply by ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Going by English experience, and this is by no means 
a universal one, judges hardly respond to press criticisms. In an annual lecture of the Judicial 
Studies Board entitled ‘Judicial Independence’, delivered on 5 November 1996, Lord 
Bingham suggested that judges should be ‘thick-skinned’ enough to ignore press comments 
or criticisms.47 On this view, judges should refrain from personal response to criticisms. 
This was also the view expressed by Lord Denning in R. v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn48 and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
the Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria.49 Yet, it has been asked, ‘if the judge decides 
not to respond, who is to speak on behalf of the judiciary?’50 Perhaps, this should be left for 
a Minister–particularly the Minister in charge of the Department of Justice, as in the U.K.51 
In fact, section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 imposes a duty on the Lord 
Chancellor (i.e. U.K Minister of Justice) to uphold the continued independence of the 
judiciary.52 Even so, it has also been forcefully and rightly argued that ‘where necessary, an 
independent judiciary should be defending itself’.53 An exemplary occasion, it has been 
suggested, is when a judge suffers a well-publicized and personal attack by a journalist of 
considerable seniority and inﬂ uence.54 It is submitted that caustic and sustained criticisms 
45 See UNICRI publication.
46 Olowofoyeku: op. cit. 1–2.
47 Bingham, T.: The Business of Judging. Oxford, 2000, 61–62. The expression “thick-skinned” 
enough to ignore press comments’ was a summary made by Alisdair Gillespie. See Gillespie, A.: The 
English Legal System. Oxford, 2007, 205.
48 R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 All England Law Re-
ports, 319, at 320. (‘Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. 
They can say we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. 
All we would ask is that those who criticize us will remember that, from the nature of our ofﬁ ce, we 
cannot reply to their criticisms.’)
49 Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, Judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A vol. 313, 
para. 34 (‘…judges who have been criticized are subject to a duty of discretion that precludes them 
from replying’).
50 Pannick, D.: Should judges respond to criticism? (The Times, 27 November 2008).
51 See Gillespie: The English Legal System. op. cit. 206–207. 
52 The duty extends to other Ministers (including the Prime Minister) and ‘all with responsibil-
ity for matters relating to the judiciary or administration of justice’. Ibid. This may be regarded as a 
codiﬁ cation of a long-standing constitutional convention. See further Article 6 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (made applicable domestically in the U.K by the Human Rights Act 1998).
53 See Pannick: Should judges respond… op. cit. Lord Pannick, QC is one of the top 10 most 
inﬂ uential UK lawyers. See ‘The Times Law 100 2009’ (The Times, 23 July 2009).
54 Ibid. 
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by an Attorney-General, senior lawyers and/or other inﬂ uential members of the society 
would qualify as such occasion. Hence, the Supreme Court of Cyprus was arguably right to 
have issued a statement in response to the avowed criticism by the Cypriot Attorney-General 
of the recent decision of the Nicosia Assize Court. Surely, it is respectfully submitted, the 
reaction of the Cypriot Attorney-General and other senior lawyers, more than that of the 
society in general, greatly damaged the legal profession and the integrity and prestige of the 
courts, judges and the entire Cypriot judicial system.
In 2008, the British Judicial Communications Ofﬁ ce issued a brief written statement in 
response to a critical media statement of the Editor of Daily Mail against a judge.55 The 
then Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, also gave an interview defending judicial 
independence. Importantly, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 
approves and encourages this approach. There are also instances in Britain when judges had 
felt able to defend themselves from public criticisms by sending their response as a letter to 
the press.56 Interestingly, the response of the Supreme Court of Cyprus is in line with the 
approach of Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine of Lairg in 2003 in response to the criticism of 
judges by the Home Secretary. He said: ‘Maturity requires that when you get a decision that 
favours you, you do not clap. And when you get one that goes against you, you do not 
boo’.57 The Supreme Court of Cyprus said much the same when it suggested that in 
attacking the judges/judiciary the Attorney-General of Cyprus had lost his ‘self-control’.58
3.2. Trial by Media versus Fair Trial59
“Trial by newspaper,” like all catch phrases, may be loosely used, but it summarizes an 
evil inﬂ uence upon the administration of criminal justice…60
Another important issue that arose in the Efstathiou case was whether the media publicity 
of the unfortunate incident compromised fair trial in the case.61 The trial court stated in its 
judgment that the media coverage of the alleged criminal act (before and during the 
proceedings)62 ‘constituted serious interference in the course of justice and pre-empted the 
outcome of the trial’,63 and that ‘it constitutes a usurpation of the judicial authority and 
contempt of court’.64 However, it has been doubted whether the media publications really 




58 See Theodoulou: Black page in the history… op. cit.
59 See generally, Law Commission of India: 200th Report on Trial by Media: Free Speech and 
Fair Trial under Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. New Delhi, 2006; available at: <http://lawcom-
missionoﬁ ndia.nic.in/reports/rep200.pdf > (accessed 27 April 2009); Eady, D.–Eady, A.–Smith: 
On Contempt, 3rd ed., London, 2005; Bonnington, A. J.–McInnes, R.–McKain, B.: Scots Law for 
Journalists 7th ed., Edinburgh, 2000.  
60 Per Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), at 351.
61 The Supreme Court of Cyprus condemned ‘trial through the press’ in Constantinides v. Vima 
Ltd., [at p. 359].
62 By the judges’ count, the number of articles written in relation to the case amounted to 361. 
See Charalambous, L. Police acquittal sets an eerie precedent for Helios trial [CyprusMail (Internet 
Edition), 29 March 2009].
63 Reproduced in Evripidou: Former European Court of Human Rights Judge… op. cit. 
64 Ibid.
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have been different.65 Even so, it must be recognized that ‘the principle of the independence 
of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are 
conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected’.66 Burges has succinctly 
explained the difference between ‘trial by media’ and ‘fair trial’, when he said:67
[T]rial by media by its very nature detracts from the notions of what the law describes 
as a fair trial. That is a trial free from prejudice. A trial where jurors [and judges] 
already have preconceived notions of the guilt or innocence of the accused can hardly 
be said to be “a fair and impartial trial” as deﬁ ned in The King v. MacFarlane, ex par-
te O’Flanaghan and O’Kelly (1923) 32 CLR 518, 541–542.
The evil of trial by media was also disapproved in Attorney-General v. English.68 Lord 
Diplock explained that the public policy that underlies the strict liability rule established 
under section 1 of the English Contempt of Court Act 1981 is ‘deterrence’. He then 
declared: 
Trial by newspaper or, as it should be more compendiously expressed today, trial by 
media, is not to be permitted in this country [U.K and, indeed, elsewhere in the world]. 
That the risk that was created by the publication when it was actually published does 
not ultimately affect the outcome of the proceedings is, as Lord Goddard C.J. said in 
Reg. v. Evening Standard Co. Ltd. [1954] 1 Q.B. 578, 582, “neither here nor there...”69
Under the Cypriot legal system, as is the case in all common law countries, an accused 
person is presumed innocent until he has been found guilty in a judicial proceeding. Article 
12(4) of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960 is categorical on this: ‘Every person charged with 
an offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law’.70 The problem 
with media reporting of criminal acts or pending cases is that it often tends to ﬁ nd the 
accused guilty before trial or conclusion of trial, contrary to the requirements of fair 
hearing.71 As Naylor categorically states, ‘it is clear that some media reporting poses a 
threat to the fair trial of the defendant’.72 In the same way, the Media Institute of Kenya has 
frankly admitted that ‘in the coverage of court proceedings by the press, there are cases 
where such coverage can imperil the administration of justice’.73 Hence, the law of contempt 
of court is meant to deter the potential effect of publications on an accused’s right to fair 
65 Ibid (per Loucaides: ‘if the media really had inﬂ uenced opinion then the judges would not 
have acquitted the ten ofﬁ cers’).
66 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 1985, Article 6.
67 Burgess, C.: Can “Dr Death” Receive a fair Trial? OUT Law & Justice Journal, (2007), 2; 
available at: < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/QUTLJJ/2007/2.html > (accessed 24 April 
2009).
68 Attorney-General v. English [1983] 1 Appeal Cases, 116.
69 Ibid. 141.
70 This is exactly the provision of Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
1950.
71 This is not to suggest that issues of public interest should not be reported or discussed; far 
from that. What is objectionable is the tendency to interfere with judicial proceedings or ﬁ nd an ac-
cused person guilty on the pages of a newspaper.
72 Naylor, B.: Fair Trial or Free Press: Legal Responses to Media Reports of Criminal Trials, 
Cambridge Law Journal, 53  (1994) 492, at 501. 
73 Makali, D. et. al: Fair Trial and the Freedom of the Press. In Makali, D. (ed.): Media Law 
and Practice: The Kenyan Jurisprudence. Nairobi, 2003.
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and impartial trial as well as to protect the honour and integrity of courts of law. As 
adumbrated above, section 1 of the English Contempt of Court Act 198174 establishes ‘strict 
liability rule’ for contempt of court cases – deﬁ ned to mean ‘the rule of law whereby conduct 
may be treated as a contempt of court as tending to interfere with the course of justice in 
particular legal proceedings regardless of intent to do so’. According to section 2(2) thereof, 
this rule applies only to ‘a publication which creates a substantial risk that the 
course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or 
prejudiced’.75 Importantly, the rule applies only if the proceedings in question are ‘active’76 
as explained in the Act: for example, from arrest with or without warrant to the conclusion 
of the case – say by acquittal or sentence.77 
In Cyprus, the law of contempt of court is contained in the Courts of Justice Law 
14/6078 (as recently amended by the Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(1)/2009).79 
Article 44(1) thereof provides in part, as follows:80 
Any person who, 
a)  within the premises in which any judicial proceeding is being had or taken, or within the 
precincts of the same, shows disrespect, in speech or manner, of or with reference to 
such proceeding or any person before whom such proceeding is being had or taken,81 or
b)  causes an obstruction or disturbance in the course of a judicial proceeding, or
c)  while a judicial proceeding is pending...publishes any writing, makes any speech, or does 
any act misrepresenting such proceeding or is capable of prejudicing the fair trial of such 
74 Revised Laws of the UK, Cap 49.
75 See generally, Miller, C. J.: Contempt of Court, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1990, Chapter 10. The law of 
contempt of court in England can partly be found in the common law.
76 Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 2(3).
77 Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 2(4) and schedule 1. This provision is based on the 
leading case of Hall v. Associated Newspaper (1978) SLT 241 (Scotland).
78 This provision is largely based on Article 49 of the previous Cap. 8. Note that the law of 
contempt of court in Cyprus was made pursuant to Article 162 of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960. 
Furthermore, Articles 150 and 162 of the Constitution give the Supreme Court and the High Court 
respectively power to punish for contempt of itself.
79 The law was earlier amended by Law 166/1987. The amendment effected by Law 36(1)/2009 
was principally designed to bring the procedural aspects of contempt in the face of the court in Cy-
prus in line with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Kyprianou v Cyprus (App 
No. 73797/01) ECHR, Judgment of 27 January 2004. Essentially, while Cypriot courts still have the 
power to punish for contempt committed in the face of the court, if the act constituting the contempt 
‘turn against the person of the judge’ (i.e. directed at the judge personally) he cannot adjudicate the 
matter personally but has to refer the matter to the President of the Supreme Court who may appoint 
another judge to adjudicate the matter. See Law 14/60 (as amended by Law 36(1)/2009), Article 44 
paras 2–10. The idea is to prevent an affected judge being a judge in his own cause, in breach of the 
right to fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
80 I am grateful to my colleague, Dr Achilles Emilianides, for drawing my attention to the re-
cent amendment of Law 14/60 by Law 36(1)/2009. Moreover, I am grateful to him for translating the 
original Greek text of Law 36(1)/2009 into English for my convenience and for his useful comments 
on the draft of this article. Furthermore, I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of another 
colleague, Nicolas Angelides, who translated other Greek texts into English for me. However, I accept 
sole responsibility for any errors found in this article.
81 See Mantis v. The Police, Cyprus Law Reports, (1979) 125; Evangelou v. Police (No. 2) 
 Cyprus Law Reports (2000) 224 (in Greek). 
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proceeding or of interrupting or delaying the course of justice or calculated to lower the 
authority of any person before whom such proceeding is being had or taken, or
d)  publishes a report of the evidence taken in any judicial proceeding at which, under this 
Law or any other Law for the time being in force, only the parties and their advocates or 
other representatives, if any, and the ofﬁ cers of the Court are permitted to be present, or
e)  publishes any writing, makes any speech or does any act containing scandalous matter 
respecting any Court which has adjudicated in any proceeding relating to any judicial 
proceeding, …
is guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable to imprisonment up to six months or to a ﬁ ne not 
exceeding 450 CP [450 Cyprus Pounds (₤CY450)] or to both sentences.82 
It is important to point out that the requirement of English law that to constitute 
contempt of court the criminal proceeding in question must be ‘active’ is generally the 
same as the requirement that the judicial proceeding be ‘pending’ under Cypriot law–i.e. 
from the time of arrest83 to the conclusion of the case. This is also the position in Nigerian 
law,84 as noted extra-judicially by Justice Alabi:85 ‘A criminal prosecution may be said to be 
pending…at any time after a person has been arrested and is in custody. It is not necessary 
that the accused person should have been committed for trial; nor is it necessary that he 
should have been brought before a court of summary jurisdiction’.86 Importantly, the same 
position holds in other common-law/commonwealth countries. For example, in AK Gopalan 
v. Noordeen87 the Indian Supreme Court held that a publication made after the ‘arrest’ of a 
person could be contempt if it was prejudicial to the suspect or accused.
In fact, under the common law it is also contempt of court to publish prejudicial 
material about a criminal case when criminal proceedings are ‘imminent’.88 Note that the 
82 Since 1 January 2008 Cyprus has adopted the Euro as its national currency. The sum of 
₤CY450 is now approximately €765 (seven hundred and sixty-ﬁ ve Euros).
83 This is consistent with the 24-hour rule under Article 11(5) of the 1960 Constitution of 
Cyprus: A ‘person arrested shall, as soon as is practicable after his arrest, and in any event not later 
than twenty-four hours after the arrest, be brought before a judge, if not earlier released’. According 
to Hall’s case, once a person is arrested he comes within the ‘care and protection’ of the court, as he 
has to be produced in court within 24 hours. In his introduction to the 200th Report of the Law [Re-
form] Commission of India, the Chairman, Justice M.J. Rao, explains that:  ‘The reason for ﬁ xing 
arrest as the starting point is that, if a publication is made after arrest referring to the person’s char-
acter, previous conviction or confessions etc., the person’s case will be prejudiced even in bail pro-
ceedings when issues arise as to whether bail is to be granted or refused, or as to what conditions 
are to be imposed and whether there should be police remand or judicial remand. Such publications 
may also affect the trial when it takes place later’. See Law Commission of India: op. cit. 
84 See generally, Fawehinmi, G.: The Law of Contempt in Nigeria (Case Book). Lagos, 1980.
85 Justice Alabi, A. A. was sometime the Chief Judge of Lagos State, Nigeria.
86 Alabi, A.A.: Contempt of Court and the Sub-Judice Rule. In Oyeyipo, T.A.–Gummi, L. H.–
Umezulike, I. A. (eds.): Judicial Integrity, Independence and Reforms: Essays in Honour of Hon. 
Justice M.L Uwais. Enugu, 2006, 181, at 183.
87 A. K. Gopalan v. Noordeen (1969) 2 Supreme Court of Cases, 734.
88 Ibid. See also Rex v. Parke (1903) 2 KB 432, at 437–438; R v. Savundranayagan, All Eng-
land Law Reports (1968), 439, 441; Attorney-General v. News Group Newspapers plc [1989] QB 
110, at 125 and 130 (per Watkins LJ); R. v. Horsham Justices (1982) 2 QB 762 (dealing with the 
term ‘imminent’ in the 1981 Act, section 4(2)). Cf. R. v. Clarke, ex parte Crippen [1910] 27 TLR 32; 
James v. Robinson (1963) 109 Commonwealth Law Reports, 593 (High Court of Australia). Note 
that the English Contempt of Court Act 1981 only amended, and did not abolish, the common law of 
contempt of court.
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contempt committed when a judicial proceeding is ‘pending’ or ‘active’ is known as sub 
judice contempt. Importantly, as can be gleaned from the provisions of Article 44 of Law 
14/60 (as amended by Law 36(1)/2009) the central purpose of sub judice contempt of court 
is to guarantee fair hearing. As Burgess rightly surmised ‘the principal aim of sub judice 
contempt is to prevent publications that may damage fair trial before any damage is 
done’.89 Furthermore, note that a case remains sub judice until the time within which notice 
of appeal might be given has expired, or, if an appeal is brought, until the appeal is heard 
and determined. This is the common law position which still applies in Nigeria,90 Cyprus 
and some other common law countries (not including Britain). Hence, some of the 
unrestrained adverse comments in the media about the decision of the Nicosia Assize Court 
on the Efstathiou case before the time of appeal to the Supreme Court of Cyprus had expired 
and also after an appeal had been lodged and pending determination could well be 
contemptuous of the court and the entire Cypriot judiciary.91 In Britain, the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981 has given more latitude to freedom of speech by modifying the common 
law position in some important respects. For instance, Section 5 thereof exempts publications 
made as or as part of a discussion in good faith of public affairs or other matters of general 
public interest from the strict liability rule established under section 1 thereof ‘if the risk of 
impediment or prejudice to particular legal proceedings is merely incidental to the 
discussion’. This development is well explained by Walker as follows:
Under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK) a publisher is not liable 
under the strict liability rule unless proceedings were ‘active’ at the time of the 
publication of the material. The First Schedule to the Act sets out when proceedings 
are ‘active’. In the case of criminal proceedings, the starting point is similar to the 
starting point for when criminal proceedings are ‘pending’ rather than ‘imminent’. 
The legislation does, however, give greater freedom to publishers than the common 
law as it is applied in Australia [and some other common law countries such as Cyprus]. 
For example, under the Act, criminal proceedings are active until there is an acquittal, 
sentence, verdict or discontinuance of the proceedings; appellate proceedings are active 
from the time they are commenced until they are disposed of or abandoned, 
discontinued or withdrawn. Unlike the common law position, the media are free to 
publish material without fear of contempt proceedings during the gap between the 
conclusion of proceedings at ﬁ rst instance and the initiation of an appeal. Furthermore, 
where a court remits criminal proceedings to the court below or orders a new trial, 
the further proceedings are active only from the conclusion of the appellate proceedings. 
It follows that a statement published before a retrial is ordered cannot constitute contempt 
on the ground only of its possible effect on a judge or jurors in any new trial.92
89 Burgess: op. cit.
90 See Fawehinmi v. A-G, Lagos State (No. 2) Nigerian Weckly Law Reports, 3 (1989) 740, Rex 
v. Duffy & ors. Ex-parte Nash, All England Law Reports, 2 (1960) 891.
91 See Constantinides v. Vima Ltd. This was an application in the Supreme Court of Cyprus for 
stay of appeal based on the contemptuous publications in newspapers made by the appellant before 
the appeal was heard. The court found that the impugned publications, ‘however benevolently one 
may interpret them...contain a scurrilous attack on the Judges who tried the case and…the judiciary 
as well.’ [At p. 357.] Accordingly, it ordered that the appeal be stayed until the appellant restores by 
appropriate action the authority of the court to do justice in the case.
92 Walker, S.: Freedom of Speech and Contempt of Court: The English and Australian Ap-
proaches Compared, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 40 (1991) 583, at 590. See also 
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It is equally important to note that in most common law jurisdictions it is settled law 
that mere criticism of the conduct of a judge or court, even if such criticism is strongly-
worded, is not contempt, as long as the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good 
faith.93 As the Nigerian Supreme Court has explained, ‘the rationale for contempt is the 
need to vindicate the dignity of the court and thereby protect due administration of justice, 
rather than to bolster the power and dignity of the judge as an individual’.94 Lord Denning 
made the same point earlier in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn 
(No. 2).95 Yet, as argued above, such criticism may impinge on the independence of the 
judiciary. In Constantinides v. Vima Ltd96 the Supreme Court of Cyprus made this point as 
follows:
On any view of the articles complained of, however benevolently one may interpret 
them, they contain a scurrilous attack on the Judges who tried the case and, the 
Judiciary as well. Mr. Constantinides, under the guise of criticism, in the ﬁ rst article 
published three days after the delivery of judg ment, questioned the impartiality of the 
trial Court, as well as the Judiciary… Nothing said in this judgment is designed to li-
mit the right of the public to criticize judicial action. Not only the public–especially 
the press–has a right, but a duty as well to criticize judicial action whenever they 
think that criticism is merited in the public interest. Nobody is above the law. Least 
of all Judges. We are duty bound to administer justice according to law. The 
administration of justice is all important to the wellbeing of society and concerns 
everyone. We are not here confronted…with a bona ﬁ de criticism of a judgment of 
the Court, but with a litigant attempting to vindicate his proclaimed rights through 
the press, by destroying the premises upon which justice is administered, that is, the 
impartiality of the Judiciary.97
Contempt of Court Act 1981, schedule 1 (paras 4, 5, 11, 15 and 16). To the like effect Parker L. J. said 
in Attorney-General v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [1987] QB 1, 17: ‘[I]t is important to remember 
that the Act…provides that the strict liability rule does not apply until the proceedings concerned 
become active. Thus a publication will be wholly protected if it happens to be made the day before 
High Court proceedings, the course of justice in which it is alleged that it will seriously prejudice or 
impede, are set down. Thereafter it will not be completely protected…’ The extant law on contempt 
of court in Cyprus may be modiﬁ ed along the current British law, since the recent amendment ef-
fected by Law 36(1)/2009 did not get to this extent. Note, however, that Walker maintains that the 
1981 British Act did not go as far as the Australian High Court has gone (in developing the common 
law) in Hinch v. Attorney-General (Victoria) Commonwealth Law Reports, (1987) 15 (High Court of 
Australia). See Walker, ibid, 585. For an overview of the English contempt of court law, see Bradley–
Ewing: op. cit. 395–404.
93 See, by example, the Nigerian case of Okoduwa v. State Nigerian Weekly Law Reports, 2 
(1988) 333. See also R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn (No. 2), Perere v. R. 
(1951) Appeal Cases, 482.
94 Okoduwa case, at 353–354 per Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. See also Faluyi v. Oderinde, Nigerian 
Weekly Law Reports, 1 (1987) 155 CA; Boyo v. Midwest (1971) 1 ALL NLR 342.
95 R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn (No. 2) 320. See also Case of 
Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, para. 34.
96 See Constantinides v. Vima Ltd.
97 Constantinides v. Vima Ltd., [at pp. 357–356 and 360 respectively, per Judge Pikis]. See also 
ibid. 358.
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No doubt the public has a ‘right to know’ and the media/press has a constitu tional/
statutory and/or traditional duty to inform the public, particularly with regard to ‘issues of 
public interest’ (including judicial matters).98 The ‘right to know’ is based on the 
fundamental right to ‘freedom of expression’ (also called ‘freedom of speech’). The 
grievous assaults, inhuman and degrading treatments allegedly meted to the two hapless 
Cypriot students by the Cyprus Police was obviously a case of public interest and the media 
was generally right in reporting it, subject to what is said below. As has been seen above, 
most observers who commented on the decision of the Nicosia Assize Court argued that it 
was within their constitutional right to freedom of expression–which states that ‘every 
person has the right to freedom of speech and expression in any form’99–to criticize 
government institutions, including courts of law. Importantly, they also suggest that the 
media was entirely right in its coverage of the case from the time of the unfortunate 
incident. 
However, the point must be made that while the right to free speech is important it 
must not be forgotten that an accused person is equally entitled under Cypriot law and 
Constitution100 as well as under the Council of Europe human rights instruments101 and 
international law102 to fair hearing.103 These opposing rights–right to freedom of speech/
expression and right to fair trial/hearing–can sometimes be in conﬂ ict. This is ‘most likely 
to arise when a media organisation publishes material which may interfere with the course 
of particular legal proceedings’.104 As Burgess has rightly observed, ‘by exercising one’s 
right to freedom of speech one can conceivably threaten another person’s right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law’.105 In Attorney-General v. MGN 
Ltd,106 Schiemann LJ put the problem in perspective when he stated:
The present application focuses, as these applications usually do, on the tension 
between two desiderata–(1) the desire that a person facing trial should face a tribunal 
which is not prejudiced against him by reason of matters which have not been proved 
98 See R. v. West [1996] 2 Criminal Appeal Reports, 374, 385–386 per Lord Taylor CJ. The 
same recognition is expressed in the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). See, 
by example, the Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, para. 34; Case of Worm v. Austria 
(83/1996/702/894), Judgment of 29 August 1997, para 50.
99 See Constitution of Cyprus 1960, Article 19(1).
100 See Constitution of Cyprus 1960, Article 30(2). See also Article 12(4) thereof.
101 For example, the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6 provides: ‘In the de-
termination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law…’ Cyprus became a State Member of the European Union on 1 May 2004, and 
has been a State Party to the European Convention on Human Rights (made under the auspices of the 
Council of Europe) much earlier (since 6 October 1962). In fact, the Cypriot constitutional Bill of 
Rights was largely taken from the Convention. 
102 See, by example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 14. Arti-
cle 19 thereof provides for the right to freedom of expression.
103 Everyone also has a right to reputation.
104 See Walker: op. cit. 583. 
105 Burgess, op. cit. The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty according to law is 
guaranteed under Article 12(4) of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960.
106 Attorney-General v. MGN Ltd. [1997] Entertaintment and Media Law Reports (1997) 284; 
All England Law Reports, (1997) 456. 
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in evidence, and (2) the desire that newspapers should be free to publish what they 
please. The tension is particularly strong in cases which are of widespread public inte-
rest because of the notoriety of the persons or deeds involved. The problems posed by 
this tension are real and recurring.107
Hence, the critical question that arises is to what extent pre-trial reporting may be 
properly made without the risk of prejudicing the accused’s ‘right to fair trial’ (also called 
‘right to fair hearing’).108 In Sheppard v. Maxwell,109 the US Supreme court considered this 
question and held that the massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity attending the 
petitioner’s prosecution prevented him from receiving a fair trial; and that though freedom 
of discussion (freedom of speech) should be given the widest range compatible with the fair 
and orderly administration of justice, it must not be allowed to divert a trial from its purpose 
of adjudicating controversies according to legal procedures based on evidence received only 
in open court. Accordingly, the court ordered a new trial for the petitioner/accused because 
of the prejudicial impact of the media publicity on his murder trial 12 years earlier. 
More recently, the same approach has been sanctioned in English cases as can be seen 
in the case of Attorney-General v. MGN Ltd.110 In that case, there had been a period of 
‘saturation coverage’ over a number of years about the relationship between a well-known 
television personality and her boyfriend. The publications disclosed his violent behaviour 
and details of his previous convictions. He was later arrested and charged with serious 
assault. Various newspapers published stories about the alleged incident. The accused 
applied successfully for a stay of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the press 
coverage of the case made it impossible for him to have a fair and impartial/un prejudiced 
trial. Although the present application for committal of some newspapers for contempt of 
court failed on its facts, this did not affect the order of stay of criminal proceedings against 
the accused which was made by the trial judge. In fact, the Divisional Court which heard 
this case observed:
The solicitor General has drawn our attention to no less than three cases in the last six 
months where … a prosecution has been stayed indeﬁ nitely because of pre-trial 
publicity. Clearly that seriously prejudices the course of justice. There must be many 
others where a trial has had to be delayed or moved to a less convenient place and 
where it could be submitted that the course of justice has been seriously impeded.111
In a nutshell, these and other relevant authorities appear to suggest that prejudicial 
publications relating to criminal suspects and accused persons should be avoided in order 
not to imperil the path of justice. For example, previous convictions and other criminal 
records should not be published and the names of suspects and accused persons should not 
107 Ibid. at 287–288. Similarly, Bradley and Ewing have observed that ‘there is a difﬁ cult ten-
sion between the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression when newspapers publish 
material which might prejudice the position of an accused person…One of the functions of the law of 
contempt of court is to manage this tension…’: Bradley–Ewing: op. cit. 396. See also Scottish Daily 
Record, Sunday Mail Ltd. v. Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh, Appeal Court High Court of Justiciary, 
(2009) 24.
108 See generally, the decision of the US Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
art, 49 L.Ed. 2d. 683 (1976); 427 US 539 (1976). 
109 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966).
110 Attorney-General v. MGN Ltd.
111 Ibid. 288.
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be mentioned when commenting on criminal issues of public interest which are the subject 
of imminent or pending judicial proceedings. Moreover, suggestions of guilt (or innocence) 
should be avoided: that is the job of the courts.
Although a ‘pro-free speech approach’–i.e. granting greater freedom of speech and 
sometimes privileging the same over the right to fair trial–can sometimes be seen in 
contemporary UK jurisprudence (based on interpretation of the 1981 English Contempt of 
Court Act and following European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence)112 as 
well as in US cases (see below), the Sheppard case approach is still generally good law in 
most common-law/commonwealth countries, such as Nigeria and Kenya, and there is 
nothing to suggest that Cypriot law is different from the general common-law/com mon-
wealth position, except to the extent that it reﬂ ects the current position of the ECtHR .113 
Importantly, note that though the Sheppard case (as well as similar UK cases) relates 
to trial by jury, its principle applies with equal force to cases tried by a judge or judges 
alone (i.e. trial without jury). Yet, some commentators on the recent Nicosia Assize Court 
decision have suggested that since the case was decided by a panel of three legally qualiﬁ ed 
judges alone without a lay jury114 there was no possibility of extraneous inﬂ uence–such as 
newspaper publications–affecting their judgment.115 For example, this was the unequivocal 
view of Loucaides.116 However, it is contended that this view is wrong. Undoubtedly, 
a judge by his training is expected to avoid adverse media publicity affecting his judgment. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that he lives in the same society as others and does 
and feels very much like other members of the society; hence, he could be inﬂ uenced by 
adverse/prejudicial publicity against an accused person standing trial before him. As Justice 
Cardozo of the US Supreme Court has pertinently reminded us in his seminal book The 
nature of the Judicial Process, ‘the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do 
not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by’.117 Similarly, Justice Alabi made this 
point extra-judicially thus:
112 See, by example, HM Advocate v. Scottish Media Newspapers Ltd. [2000] SLT 331; Cox and 
Grifﬁ ths, Petitioners (1998) JC 267 (High Court of Justiciary, Scotland); Attorney-General v. Inde-
pendent Television News Ltd. and Others [1995] 1 Criminal Appeal Reports, 204.
113 The current position in Australia is probably more developed than what obtains under the 
1981 English Contempt of Court Act. See Walker, op. cit., 584–585. See also Hinch v. Attorney-
General (Victoria).
114 The Jury system (a system whereby lay persons determine questions of fact, leaving the 
judge/judges to determine questions of law) is not used in Cypriot judicial system.
115 See Attorney-General v. BBC [1981] AC 303 (HL), at 315, per Lord Denning MR. Lord 
Denning’s view on this was not accepted by the House of Lords in this case.
116 Another commentator expressed the same view thus: ‘…the rule on prior publicity, adverse 
or favourable, would sit better if we had trials by jury; a judge (or, worse, a group of judges sitting 
together) cannot rightly claim that publicity may have affected their single or collective judgment…
Such hinted admission should in fact disqualify them from being a judge in the ﬁ rst place’. See C. 
Lordes, ‘Our justice system is in dire need of an overhaul’ [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 25 March 
2009]. 
117 Justice Benjamin N Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale. 1921. Lecture IV: 
Adherence to Precedent. The Subconscious Element in the Judicial Process; referring to the ‘forces 
which enter into the conclusions of Judges, 168. 
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In the case of a trial by a judge alone, it is only in rare cases that a publication will 
be held to constitute a contempt…as it is accepted that judges are capable of guarding 
against allowing any prejudicial matter to inﬂ uence them in deciding a case; but a 
campaign of pressure might be so great that even a judge could not be safely assumed 
to be unaffected by it.118 (emphasis added)
According to the Indian Supreme Court, publications which are prejudicial to a suspect 
or accused may also affect judges ‘subconsciously’, and this can be at the stage of granting 
or refusing bail or at the trial. In In re PC Sen,119 the Supreme Court stated that ‘no 
distinction is, in our judgment, warranted that comment on a pending case or abuse of a 
party may amount to contempt when the case is triable with the aid of a Jury and not when 
it is triable by a Judge or Judges’.120 Importantly, this reasoning and conclusion can be 
seen in the decision of the Supreme Court of Cyprus in Georgiades v. Republic.121 
Furthermore, the point was made even much clearer by the US Supreme Court in Pennekamp 
v. Florida,122 thus:
No judge ﬁ t to be one is likely to be inﬂ uenced consciously except by what he sees 
and hears in court and by what is judicially appropriate for his deliberations. 
However, judges are also human, and we know better than did our forbears how 
powerful is the pull of the unconscious and how treacherous the rational process. 
While the ramparts of reason have been found to be more fragile than the Age of 
Enlightenment had supposed, the means for arousing passion and confusing judgment 
have been reinforced. And since judges, however stalwart, are human, the delicate 
task of administering justice ought not to be made unduly difﬁ cult by irresponsible 
print… If men, including judges and journalists, were angels, there would be no 
problems of contempt of court. Angelic judges would be undisturbed by extraneous 
inﬂ uences, and angelic journalists would not seek to inﬂ uence them.123 (emphasis 
added)
The same point was forcefully made in England by Lord Dilhorne in Attorney-General 
v. BBC:124 
It is sometimes asserted that no Judge will be inﬂ uenced in his judgment by anything 
said by the media and consequently that the need to prevent the publication of matter 
prejudicial to the hearing of a case only exists where the decision rests with laymen. 
This claim to judicial superiority over human frailty is one that I ﬁ nd some difﬁ culty 
in accepting. Every holder of a judicial ofﬁ ce does his utmost not to let his mind be 
affected by what he has seen or heard or read outside the court and he will not 
knowingly let himself be inﬂ uenced in any way by the media, nor in my view will 
any layman experienced in the discharge of judicial duties. Nevertheless, it should, I 
think, be recognized that a man may not be able to put that which he has seen, heard 
118 Alabi: op. cit. 184. See also R. v Davies, All England Law Reports, 2 (1945) 167.
119 In re PC Sen (1970) All India Reporter, 1970 SC 1821.
120 Ibid., at 1829. See also Reliance Petrochemicals v. Proprietor of Indian Express (1988) 4 
SCC 592.
121 Georgiades v. Republic, 2 Cyprus Law Reports, 1 (2003) (in Greek).
122 Pennekamp v. Florida.
123 Pennekamp v. Florida,  357–366 per Justice Frankfurter.
124 Attorney-General v. BBC.
21REVISITING THE ACQUITTAL OF 10 POLICEMEN
or read entirely out of his mind and that he may be sub consciously affected by it. It 
is the law, and it remains the law until it is changed by Parliament, that the 
publications of matter likely to prejudice the hearing of a case before a court of law will 
constitute contempt of court punishable by ﬁ ne or imprisonment or both.125
Note that in accordance with the common-law doctrine of judicial precedents, under 
the Cypriot legal system foreign judgments–particularly from common-law/commonwealth 
jurisdictions (UK, US, India, Nigeria, etc.)–are regarded as persuasive precedents whereas 
judgments of superior courts (particularly the Supreme Court of Cyprus) are binding on all 
lower courts in the country. Hence, based on the above binding and persuasive precedents, 
it is arguable that the Nicosia Assize Court judges were entitled to hold, as they did hold 
(assuming the publications, under Cypriot law, can properly be considered as tending to 
interfere with the outcome of the case before them126) that the impugned media publications 
‘constituted serious interference in the course of justice and pre-empted the outcome of the 
trial’, and that ‘it constitutes a usurpation of the judicial authority and contempt of court’ 
(see above). More over, they were right–based on the above authorities127–to conclude 
that prejudicial media publications can be held to interfere with judicial proceedings 
pending before a judge or judges sitting with or without jurors.128 On the contrary, it is clear 
that the assertion of Loucaides that ‘media inﬂ uence is irrelevant to the proceedings, and in 
the cases of professional judges (with no jury), the issue of media inﬂ uence does not arise’ 
(see above) cannot be correct. In fact, there are several cases–for example Eﬁ meris 
“O Filathlos” & Anor. v. The Police129–where Cypriot judges (sitting without jury) had 
punished persons who published articles adjudged capable of prejudicing the fair trial of a 
pending judicial proceeding, for contempt of court. The position is the same under the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, contrary to the assertion of Loucaides. Surely, the decision of 
the ECtHR in the Case of Worm v. Austria,130 mentioning the possibility of adverse pre-trial 
publication affecting ‘lay judges’ did not imply, and was clearly not intended to imply, that 
‘legally learned judges’ cannot be affected by adverse pre-trial publications.
The same conclusions had been reached a long time ago in Nigeria and in other 
common law countries–especially Britain, which was the former colonial master of both 
Nigeria and Cyprus. The 1926 Nigerian case of Rex v. Ojukoko,131 decided by Tew, J (citing 
well-established English cases on the point) is a good case in point. In that case, some 
125 Ibid. 335.
126 A guide can be found in several decisions of the Supreme Court of Cyprus. Under the 
English Contempt of Court Act 1981 (section 2(2)), two tests must be satisﬁ ed in order for publica-
tions to be held contemptuous–namely, that the publications created a ‘sub stantial risk’ and ‘serious 
prejudice’. Moreover, the proximity of the publications to the trial is another important considera-
tion. See Attorney-General v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., 15–16; Attorney-General v. Independ-
ent Television News Ltd. & Others, Criminal Appeal Reports, 1 (1995) 204, at 208.
127 Especially the binding authority of Georgiades v. Republic.
128 A UK criminal court recently frowned against unfair media coverage of a pending crimi-
nal case. See ‘Ibori’s London case: Judge condemns unfair media coverage’ (Vanguard, 23 Septem-
ber 2009); available at: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/09/23/iboris-london-case-judge-con-
demns-unfair-media-coverage/> (accessed 23 September 2009).
129 Eﬁ meris “O Filathlos” & Anor. v. The Police, Cyprus Law Reports, 2 (1967) 249. See also 
Georgiades v. Republic.
130 Case of Worm v. Austria.
131 Rex v. Ojukoko (1926) 7 NLR 60.
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newspapers had published articles alluding to a theft of various articles from Government 
House, Lagos, and stated that the crime had been traced to an ex-convict who had only 
recently been discharged from prison. Following this, the Attorney-General of Nigeria made 
applications to the Divisional Court in Lagos for the editors of three named newspapers 
involved in the publications to be committed to prison for contempt of court. The editors 
were found guilty of contempt of court.132 In his judgment, the judge pertinently said:
It cannot be too widely made known that the publication of such statements were 
calculated, in the language of Lord Hardwicke in Roach v. Garvan… “to prejudice the 
minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in causes before the cause is 
ﬁ nally heard”, constitutes a serious contempt of court and will not be allowed to pass 
unnoticed or unpunished… In Rex v. Tibbits… Lord Alverstone, CJ said: … It would, 
indeed, be far-fetched to infer that the articles would in fact have any effect upon the 
mind of either magistrate or judge, but the essence of the offence is conduct calculated 
to produce, so to speak, an atmosphere of prejudice in the midst of which the 
proceedings must go on. Publications of that character have been punished over and 
over again as contempts of court, where the legal proceedings pending did not involve 
trial by jury, and where no one would imagine that the mind of the magistrates or 
judges charged with the case would or could be induced thereby to swerve from the 
straight course. The offence is much worse where trial by jury is about to take place… 
[It] is not desirable that fair and proper comment on matters of public interest should 
be restrained; at the same time, the public and the press should be given clearly to 
understand that … [the] court will not tolerate any interference with the right of any 
person who may be charged with an offence to a fair and impartial trial. (emphasis 
added)
More importantly, under Cypriot constitutional law the right to freedom of expression 
is not absolute.133 The Constitution provides that the exercise of this right ‘may be subject 
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penal ties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary only in the interests of the se curity of the Republic…or for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others or … for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary’.134 This is consistent with Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which provides, inter alia, that the right to freedom of expression may be 
restricted in order to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judici ary.135 Clearly, 
132 Two of them admitted responsibility and apologized to the court before the judg ment in 
the case and were ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings; the third who did not properly apolo-
gize was additionally ﬁ ned and was to be committed to prison if he failed to pay the ﬁ ne within 
twenty-four hours.
133 Compare the First Amendment of the American Constitution (dealing with the freedom of 
speech and expression): though the right is couched in absolute terms, the Supreme Court has held 
in a long line of cases that its proper interpretation requires that it be not allowed to be used to frus-
trate the enjoyment of other rights; it is limited to the principle of ‘clear and present danger’ when it 
comes in conﬂ ict with the right to fair trial. See also the Fourteenth Amendment.  See further Schenck 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204; Debs v. United States, 249 
U.S. 211. 
134 Constitution of Cyprus 1960, Article 19(3) (emphasis added).
135 See Handyside v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A, No. 24; 
1 EHHR 737 (1979–80). 
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therefore, the exercise of the right to free speech is subject, inter alia, to the law of contempt 
of court: it cannot be used, for instance, to publish any writing or make any speech that is 
capable of prejudicing the fair trial of an accused person in a judicial proceeding,136 or to 
publish any speech containing scandalous matter respecting any court which has adjudi cated/
decided any case.137 In Constantinides v. Vima Ltd138 the Supreme Court of Cyprus categori-
cally stated that ‘Section 44 [of the Courts of Justice Law 14/60 (as amended)] limits 
freedom of expression safeguarded by Article 19 [of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960] for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the Judiciary,’ and this is in accordance with 
Article 19(3) of the Constitution.139 Based on this, it is possible that some of the pre- and 
during as well as post- trial com ments on the Efstathiou case were contemptuous of the 
Nicosia Assize Court speciﬁ  cally (as already noted, the court itself had also described the 
pre-trial media publicity of the case as contemptuous) and/or the Cypriot judiciary in 
general. 
Note that it could be contempt of court all the same even if the ten policemen had been 
convicted of the offences with which they were charged. As Lord Alverstone stated long 
ago in Rex v. Tibbits:140
Though the accused be really guilty of the offence charged against him, the course of 
law and justice is nevertheless perverted and obstructed if those who have to try him 
are induced to approach the question of his guilt or innocence with minds into which 
prejudice has been instilled by published assertions of the guilt or imputations against 
his life and character to which the laws of the land refuse admissibility as evidence.
More recently, Lord Diplock re-stated the same point thus: ‘…That the risk that was 
created by publication when it was actually published does not ultimately affect the outcome 
of the proceedings is… “neither here nor there”. If there was a reasonable possibility that it 
might have done so if in the period subsequent to the publication the proceedings had not 
taken the course that in fact they did…the offence was complete. The true course of justice 
must not at any stage be put at risk’.141 In Rex v Parke,142 Wills J. explained that ‘the reason 
why the publication of articles … is treated as a contempt of court is because their tendency 
and sometimes their object is to deprive the court of the power of doing that which is the end 
for which it exists–namely, to administer justice duly, impartially, and with reference solely 
to the facts judicially brought before it’.143
Having considered prejudicial publications that tend to interfere with judicial 
proceedings, it is now proposed to brieﬂ y advert to scandalous publications–i.e. publications 
scandalizing a judge or court.144 There are reasonable grounds to suggest that some of the 
post-judgment media attacks on the judges who decided the Efstathiou case as well as on 
the Cypriot judiciary in general probably scandalized the judges and the entire Cypriot 
136 Courts of Justice Law 14/60, Article 44(1)(c) (as amended).
137 Courts of Justice Law 14/60, Article 44(1)(e) (as amended).
138 Constantinides v. Vima Ltd. [1983].
139 Ibid. 354.
140 Rex v. Tibbits [1902] 1 King’s Bench, 77.
141 See Attorney-General v. English.
142 Rex v. Parke. 
143 Cf. Hinch v. Attorney-General (Victoria).
144 See generally, Fawehinmi, G.: Nigerian Law of the Press under the Constitution and the 
Criminal Law. Lagos, 1987, Chapter 1 (on the aspect of the Press and Criminal Law).
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judiciary, and were contemptuous in accordance with Article 44(1)(e) of the Courts of 
Justice Law 14/60 (as amended). For example, the statement of Loucaides that the judges 
who decided the case ‘may be not sufﬁ ciently trained’–a suggestion that they were not 
qualiﬁ ed to sit as judges. (Another example is the Cypriot Attorney-General’s statement 
that Cypriots ‘can’t always trust court decisions’: see above.) The point is that this kind of 
statement is not a legitimate public criticism of a judge; rather it is a ‘scurrilous personal 
abuse of a judge with reference to his conduct as a judge in a judicial proceeding which 
had terminated’145–and this is what makes it a contempt of court, according to well-
established and long-standing legal authorities.146 There are several instances in the case-
law of common-law/commonwealth countries when contemnors of this species of 
contempt of court have been punished by the court. The same position can also be found 
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).147 For present 
purposes, it is sufﬁ cient to refer only to the facts and outcome of two such cases from 
national courts and one decision of the ECtHR. 
Firstly, in the Nigerian case of Obiekwe Aniweta v. The State,148 an Advocate of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria swore to two afﬁ davits accusing a trial judge of corruption, and 
expressing his opinion that the judge is ‘not ﬁ t to hold any judicial ofﬁ ce’. By swearing 
them before a commissioner for oaths in a court registry, the lawyer had published the 
contents thereof. The trial judge considered the afﬁ davits to be ‘scandalous publications’ and 
summarily convicted the lawyer for contempt of court after giving him an opportunity to 
enter his defence. Dissatisﬁ ed, the lawyer appealed to the Court of Appeal, but his appeal 
was dismissed for lacking merit.149 In its judgment, the Court of Appeal stated:
145 See Rex v. Horatius (1925) 6 NLR 49 per Combe C.J. See also Article 44(1)(e) of the Courts 
of Justice Law 14/60 (as amended).
146 This kind of contempt is punishable brevi manu (i.e. by summary process). See Mcleod v. St. 
Aubyn (1899) AC 549; R. v. Gray (1900) 2 QB 36; Ambard v. A-G for Trinidad and Tobago (1936) 
AC 322. Cf. The UK Practice Direction of 5 June 2001 (though of limited application: applies only 
to inferior courts). Within the Council of Europe it is no longer possible for a judge to personally try 
such cases summarily if they are held to constitute contempt in the face of his court. According to a 
learned author, ‘The Kyprianou judgment [of the European Court of Human Rights] ﬁ nally puts to 
sleep the practice that a judge can deal with contempt in the face of the court himself…Many leading 
authorities concerning contempt in the face of the court should be considered as obsolete, in so far as 
they provide for the possibility of the judge to deal with such cases himself’. See Emilianides, A. C.: 
Contempt in the Face of the Court and the Right to a Fair Trial: The Implications of Kyprianou v. Cy-
prus, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 13 (2005) 401, at 412. Accord-
ingly, the Cypriot Law 36 (2009), which recently amended Law 14/60 to implement the Kyprianou 
judgment, permits a continuation of summary trial of such cases, save that if the contempt affects the 
person of the presiding judge he cannot personally hear it.
147 Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria.
148 Obiekwe Aniweta v. The State, Appeal No. FCA/E/47/78 decided on 16 June 1978. (Re-
ported in Fawehinmi: op. cit. 98.)
149 The trial judge committed the lawyer to prison for 200 days, but this was reduced to 120 
days by the Court of Appeal after upholding the conviction of the appellant, on the ground that 
the sentence of 200 days was ‘severe’. More recently (precisely on 25 September 2009), a senior 
Nigerian lawyer was sentenced to three months imprisonment for contempt of court (the charge 
was scurrilous personal abuse of a judge with reference to her conduct as a judge in a judicial 
proceeding which had terminated. Brieﬂ y, the lawyer, having suffered a default judgment from 
the judge, ﬁ led an application to set aside the judgment and supported it with a 28-paragraph af-
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Can anyone reading the two afﬁ davits in the present case before us say that they were 
genuine criticism of the learned trial judge’s judgment? Our answer is No. Those 
afﬁ davits had nothing to do with any criticism. They were a brutal attack on the person 
of the judge as a most corrupt person unﬁ t to hold his high ofﬁ ce. We hold the view, 
and we are supported by the authorities, that in the circumstances of the case, as 
described by the learned trial judge, it was a matter that he could try summarily on 
his motion, because it was a contempt committed in the cognizance of the court… [In] 
the words of Holroyd, J in R. v. Davison (1821) 106 ER 958…no judge would “suffer 
those things to pass which will make him despicable in the eyes of others. It is his duty 
to support the dignity of his station and uphold the law, so that in his presence, at least 
it shall not be infringed.”150
Among others, the Nigerian Court of Appeal relied on the English Court of Appeal 
decision in Balogh v. Crown Court,151 where it was said, inter alia, that in cases of 
scandalous publications against a judge or court it mattered not whether it was ‘a case that 
was being tried, or about to be tried, or just over – no matter whether the judge saw it with 
his own eyes or it was reported to him by the ofﬁ cers of the court, or by others…’
The second and more recent case was a decision of the High Court of Singapore in 
Attorney-General v. Tan Liang Joo and Others.152 In that case, the Attorney-General of 
Singapore had applied to the High Court for an order committing three respondents to 
prison for contempt of court in that they scandalized the Singapore judiciary, inter alia, by 
publicly wearing a white T-shirt, imprinted with a palm-sized picture of a kangaroo dressed 
in a judge’s gown within and in the vicinity of the Supreme Court on 26 May 2008 when a 
hearing was being held before Justice Belinda Ang. The applicant argued that by stigmatizing 
the Singapore judiciary as a ‘kangaroo court’ the respondents implied, inter alia, that the 
court was self-appointed or a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are 
disregarded, perverted, or parodied. In their defence, the respondents contended, inter alia, 
that wearing the T-shirt was an act of ‘fair criticism and self-expression in the hope that the 
Singapore judiciary would improve from strength to strength’. They denied that they had 
committed any contempt and refused to apologize to the court.  In her well-considered 
judgment, which went on excursus into the case-law of several commonwealth countries, 
including Britain, Australia and New Zealand, the judge rejected the defence of fair criticism 
and found the respondents guilty of contempt of court. In her words: 
It was clear to me that this case was about much more than merely wearing a T-shirt. 
The conduct of the respondents communicated to an average member of the public the 
ﬁ davit wherein he deposed, inter alia, that the judge is ‘a complete failure in her capacity as a 
judge’). Note that the contempt charge was brought against the lawyer by the Attorney-General of 
Lagos state in order to protect the integrity, honour and independence of the judiciary. See ‘Judge 
Jails Lawyer For Three Months Over Contempt’ (Guardian, 26 September 2009); <http://nspace.
nigeria.com/main/news/judge-jails-lawyer-three-months-over-contempt-guardian-nigeria> (access-
ed 27 September 2009).
150 See also Rex v. Horatius; In re Ekpu (decision of a Special Military Tribunal in Lagos on 
4 February 1986, convicting a journalist on a charge of contempt of court for calling the tribunal a 
‘Kangaroo court’ in a magazine article; reported in Fawehinmi: op. cit. 573.
151 Balogh v. Crown Court, 3 All England Law Reports, (1974) 283 CA.
152 Attorney-General v. Tan Liang Joo and Others [2009] SGHC 41 (decided 18 February 
2009).
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respondents’ conviction that the Singapore courts are “kangaroo courts” as deﬁ ned 
… above…153 The respondents’ conduct amounted to contumacious contempt aimed 
at the integrity of the courts and was designed to degrade the administration of justice. 
Having considered all the circumstances, I came to the conclusion that a custodial 
sentence was appropriate.154
With regard to the ECtHR jurisprudence, in the Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. 
Austria155 the applicants had been convicted by Austrian courts for unjustiﬁ ed personal 
attacks on some Austrian judges (especially Judge J.) published in a periodical called 
Forum. Among others, the publication alleged that the named Austrian judges ‘treat each 
accused at the outset as if he had already been convicted’. In this application, the applicants 
claimed that their conviction for contempt of court156 was a violation of their right to 
freedom of expression. However, after considering the circumstances of the case, the 
ECtHR concluded that the applicants’ right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights was not breached by their conviction by the 
Austrian courts. In an important passage of its judg ment, the court stated:
Of the accusations levelled by those allegations, some were extremely serious.  It is 
therefore hardly surprising that their author should be expected to explain himself. 
By maintaining that the Viennese judges “treat each accused at the outset as if he had 
already been convicted”, or in attributing to Judge J. an “arrogant” and “bullying” 
attitude in the performance of his duties, the applicant had, by implication, accused 
the persons concerned of having, as judges, broken the law or, at the very least, of 
having breached their professional obligations. He had thus not only damaged their 
reputation, but also undermined public conﬁ dence in the integrity of the judiciary as 
a whole. (para. 36). 
To sum up, it can be seen that courts of law have awesome powers to punish for 
contempt of court in order, primarily, to maintain the dignity, integrity and authority of 
the courts. This position remains the same today, although within the Council of Europe the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) dictates that, in order to 
ensure fair trial, contempt proceedings–particularly ex facie–should be heard by a judge 
other than the one against whom (and probably against whose court) it was allegedly 
committed.157 
On the other hand, it must be noted that the courts are slow to invoke their powers of 
contempt to abridge the right to freedom of expression.158 The US, British and other 
commonwealth courts, for instance, adopt a careful balancing of the conﬂ icting rights of 
free speech and fair hearing. As Lord Reid has stated in Attorney-General v. Times 
153 Ibid., para. 28.
154 Ibid., para. 45.
155 Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria.
156 The ECHR agreed with the government of Austria that the conviction of the accused was 
intended, inter alia, to maintain the authority of the judiciary. See ibid, para. 31 of the judgment. 
157 See Kyprianou v Cyprus. See also Emilianides: op. cit.
158 Courts usually exercise their powers of contempt of court sparingly. In R. v. Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn (No. 2), at p. 320 Lord Denning observed: ‘… [T]his court 
has been called on to consider an allegation of contempt against itself. It is a jurisdiction which un-
doubtedly belongs to us, but which we will most sparingly exercise: more particularly as we ourselves 
have an interest in the matter.’ See also R. v. Moran, 81 Criminal Appeal Reports, (1985) 51. 
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Newspapers,159 ‘public policy generally requires a balancing of interests which may conﬂ ict. 
Freedom of speech should not be limited to any greater extent than is necessary but it cannot 
be allowed where there would be real prejudice to the administration of justice’.160 This 
approach was followed in the US in Bridges v. California.161 In that case, a litigant who had 
been found guilty of contempt of court for publishing a telegram wherein he had described 
a judge’s decision as ‘outrageous’, while a motion for a new trial was pending, had his 
conviction set aside on the ground that the publication did not present ‘a clear and present 
danger’. Mr. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the US Supreme Court, stated:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from 
published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion… An 
enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the 
bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than 
it would enhance respect. 
It is important to emphasize that this is a reasonable approach, which can also be found 
in a long line of cases decided by the ECtHR. In the end, it can be surmised that courts in 
common law jurisdictions as well as the ECtHR strive (to a greater or lesser extent in 
practical terms) to achieve a proper balance between freedom of expression and the need to 
maintain the authority and independence of the judiciary.162 The critical question remains 
how the balancing exercise may be conducted. A number of cases decided by the courts of 
common-law/commonwealth countries163 as well as the jurisprudence of the ECtHR provide 
some guidelines to this complex act. For present purposes, it is sufﬁ cient to brieﬂ y explain 
the approach of the ECtHR. Within the Council of Europe, the question is, essentially and 
quite often, whether an adjudged interference with the right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights164 can be justiﬁ ed under any of 
the exceptions stated under Article 10(2) thereof.165 In which case, there would be no 
159 Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers (1974) AC 273.
160 The Indian Supreme Court follows the same approach: see AK Gopalan v. Noordeen. 
161 Bridges v. California, 314 US 252 (1941). This case has been followed by a long line of 
cases in the U.S., including Pennekamp v. Florida.
162 On the need for balance, see ECHR decision in Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova (Appli-
cation no. 60115/00), Judgment of 20 April 2004, para. 28.
163 See, for example, Hinch v. Attorney-General (Victoria); Attorney-General v. English; Attor-
ney-General v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. See also Walker: op. cit. 594–595.
164 The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights greatly inﬂ uenced the Bill of Rights found 
in the Constitution of most commonwealth countries. In fact, the Convention provisions are in most 
cases reproduced verbatim.
165 Article 10 provides in full as follows:
   1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. this right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcast-
ing, television or cinema enterprises. 
   2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are neces-
sary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in conﬁ dence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
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violation of Article 10(1). Importantly, to reach a conclusion one way or the other involves 
examining the interference to determine whether it is prescribed by an existing law; 
whether the aim pursued by the interference was legitimate; and whether it is necessary in a 
democratic society, inter alia, for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
If any of these considerations fail, then the interference would be held to violate the right to 
freedom of expression. In the Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova166 the ECtHR explained 
as follows: 
In performing its supervisory role, the Court [ECtHR] has to look at the interference 
complained of in the light of the case as a whole, including the tenor of the applicant’s 
remarks and the context in which they were made, and determine whether it 
“correspond[ed] to a pressing social need”, was “proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are 
“relevant and sufﬁ cient” (see The Sunday Times (no. 2)…, and Nikula v. Finland, no. 
31611/96, § 44, ECHR 2002-II). (para. 30).167
Note that within the Council of Europe the assessment of these factors falls in the ﬁ rst 
place to the national authorities (including an independent court), which enjoys a certain 
margin of appreciation in determining the existence and extent of the necessity of an 
interference with the freedom of expression.168 
Nevertheless, while the balancing approach remains generally true in most common-
law/commonwealth countries, a pro-freedom of the press/freedom of speech approach can 
be observed in several decisions of the ECtHR169 as well as decisions of US courts (e.g. 
Bridges case) and English courts (particularly since the 1981 English Contempt of Court 
Act was made and following ECtHR jurisprudence). As Lloyd L.J. observed in Attorney-
General v. Newspaper Publishing Plc:170
[T]he statutory purpose behind the 1981 Act was to effect a permanent shift in the 
balance of public interest away from the protection of the administration of justice and 
in favour of freedom of speech. Such a shift was forced on the United Kingdom by the 
decision of the European Court [of Human Rights] in The Sunday Times v. U.K…171
166 Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova. See also Jersild v. Denmark, Judgment of 23 September 
1994 (Series A no. 298); Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, para. 35; Case of Kobenter and 
Standard Verlags GMBH v. Austria (Application no. 60899/00), Judgment of 2 November 2006.
167 The ECHR found in this case that even though the impugned critical remarks may be 
regarded as showing a certain lack of regard for the Constitutional Court of Moldova following 
its decision on the constitutionality of legislation regulating the legal profession, they cannot be 
described as grave or as insulting to the judges of the court. Accordingly, it was held that restrict-
ing the applicant’s right to freedom of expression (he was ordered to pay administrative ﬁ ne for 
his remarks) was a violation of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
168 See Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, para. 35.
169 See, by example, The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (Series A No 30), European Court of 
Human Rights (1979–1980) 2 European Human Rights Reports, 245, Judgment of 26 April 1979; 
The Times (No. 2) v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 13166/87), Judgment of 26 November 
1990; Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova.
170 Attorney-General v Newspaper Publishing Plc, 3 All England Law Reports, (1987) 276.
171 Ibid, 310; Attorney-General v. Newspaper Publishing Plc [1988] Ch. 333, at 382.
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A similar statement, albeit not quite extremist as the above, can also be found in the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Cyprus in Cosmos Press Ltd & Anor. v. The Police:172 
In the light of the modern trend in interpreting and applying provisions relating to 
human rights, such as Article 19 of our Constitution and corresponding Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which forms part of our own law as well, 
[see European Convention on Human Rights (Ratiﬁ cation) Law 1962–Law 39/62] 
and in the light, also, of weighty dicta such as those of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the judg ment of “The Sunday Times case,”… section 122(b) of Cap. 154, 
which is a restriction of the right of expression, must be applied in each particular 
case in a manner as favourable as possible for the freedom of the press.
Even so, this does not spell the end of criminal contempt of court; it only means 
that the courts are slow to abridge the right to freedom of speech but in clear cases it will 
still ﬁ nd certain publications, for instance, as contemptuous.173 This is arguably the current 
position in Cyprus, given that it is a reﬂ ection of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.174
4. Concluding Remarks
The recent Efstathiou case decision in Cyprus has provided an opportunity to re-appraise 
the issues of independence of the judiciary, trial by media and fair trial in the country as 
well as the closely linked issue of contempt of court.  While there is no suggestion that the 
Cypriot judiciary has no independence, the case has raised issues which threaten the 
independence – for example, whether the right to freedom of speech can be used to interfere 
with judicial proceedings or engage in scurrilous abuse of a judge because of his judicial 
opinion in a case. 
As could be observed from various cases cited here from various common-law 
jurisdictions, in criminal contempt of court cases–particularly with regard to prejudicial and 
scandalous publications–the application to commit the accused to prison for contempt of 
court is normally brought by the Attorney-General of the State.175 This is also true in the 
Republic of Cyprus, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Constantinides v. Vima Ltd.176 
Note that this position is based on constitutional and/or statutory provisions that invest the 
Attorney-General with the power to commence and/or discontinue all criminal prosecutions 
(including the criminal offence of contempt of court). More importantly, this is a pre-
eminent way by which the Attorney-General ensures the maintenance of respect, honour 
and dignity for the judiciary or, to put it differently, the protection and defence of the 
independence of the judiciary.177 In the Republic of Cyprus, the prosecutory power of the 
172 Cosmos Press Ltd. & Anor v. The Police, Cyprus Law Reports, (1985) 73, at 81.
173 See, by example, Attorney-General v. Express Newspapers England and Wales High Court, 
(2004) 2859 (Admin); Attorney-General v. MGN Ltd.; Scottish Daily Record, Sunday Mail Ltd. v. 
Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh. See generally Attorney-General of the Republic v. Efstathiou.
174 See, by example, Case of Worm v. Austria; Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria. See 
generally Attorney-General of the Republic v. Efstathiou. 
175 In Australia it is possible for any person to bring an action alleging contempt of court by 
publication. See R. v. Dunbabin, 53 Commonwealth Law Reports, (1935) 434 (High Court of Aus-
tralia), at 445 (per Rich J.). See also Walker: op. cit. 588.
176 Constantinides v. Vima Ltd., at 353.
177 It is also the case that the Attorney-General of a State normally responds to public criti-
cisms of judges. See, by example, C. Dyer, ‘Plea for end to attacks on Woolf’ (Guardian, 13 Novem-
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Attorney-General is provided in Article 113(2) of the Constitution of Cyprus 1960 which 
states that:
The Attorney-General of the Republic shall have power, exercisable at his discretion in 
the public interest, to institute, conduct, take over and continue or discontinue any 
proceedings for an offence against any person in the Republic. Such power may be 
exercised by him in person or by ofﬁ cers subordinate to him acting under and in 
accordance with his instructions.178
The recent sad development in Cyprus, where the Attorney-General was himself 
probably liable for contempt of court, has revealed the limitation of this position and raised 
the question ‘who prosecutes the prosecutor?’179 This is particularly serious having regard 
to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Kyprianou case.180 In 
that case, a Cypriot trial court had convicted a lawyer for alleged contempt in the face of 
the court (the lawyer suggested that a male and female member of a 3-member panel of 
judges were sending ‘love notes’ to each other while he was conducting his case for his 
client before them instead of listening to him) and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment.181 
However, the conviction and sentence were set aside on the application of the lawyer to the 
ECtHR on the ground that it breached his right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the court (ECtHR), the proper 
thing to do is to ‘refer the question to the competent prosecuting authorities for investigation 
and, if warranted, prosecution, and to have the matter determined by a different bench from 
the one before which the problem arose’.182 
Importantly, the Cypriot government has recently amended the Cypriot contempt of 
court law in order to bring it in line with the Kyprianou case decision of the ECtHR.183 
Essentially, Article 44(3) of the Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(1)/2009 forbids a 
Cypriot judge from trying an ex facie contempt of court case where the act constituting the 
contempt affects the judge personally.184 Moreover, under Article 44(9) of Law 36(1)/2009 
lawyers conducting cases before a court are immune from the offence of contempt of court 
in the face of the court.185 The reason for this is said to be ‘the need to safeguard freedom of 
ber 2004); <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/nov/13/ukcrime.media> (accessed 12 May 2009). 
The Plea was made by Lord Goldsmith, Attorney-General of the UK, in defence of Lord Chief Justice 
Lord Woolf who was suffering persistent press attack.
178 See. Loizu, A. N.–Pikis, G. M.: Criminal Procedure in Cyprus. Nicosia, 1975.
179 The difﬁ culties of this situation can be gleaned from the recent Ruling of the Supreme Court 
of Cyprus in Attorney-General of the Republic v. Efstathiou (Supreme Court Ruling of 8 October 
2009). 
180 See Kyprianou v. Cyprus. For a useful comment on this decision, see Emilianides: op. cit.
181 The lawyer’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Cyprus was unsuccessful.
182 Kyprianou v. Cyprus, para. 37.
183 See Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(1)/2009.
184 Query: Did the amendment effected by the Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(1)/2009) 
fully comply with the ECHR decision in the Kyprianou case? A Cypriot Advocate and scholar, Dr 
Achilles Emilianides, answers this query in the afﬁ rmative (email communication, 21/09/09).
185 On grounds of public policy, they are also immune from an action for negligence at the suit 
of a client in respect of their conduct or management of a cause in court. See Rondel v. Worsley, 1 Ap-
peal Cases, (1969) 191, at 227. This is no longer the case in England. See Arthur J.S. Hall and Co. v. 
Simons, 1 Appeal Cases, (2002) 615.
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expression and speech of advocates and the right to a fair trial of parties represented by the 
advocates’.186 (Further amendment in line with the English Contempt of Court Act 1981 
may be considered in order to further enlarge the right to freedom of expression). However, 
acts which hitherto would have constituted contempt of court ex facie within the meaning 
of Article 44(1) of Law 14/60 (as amended by Law 36(1)/2009) – for example showing 
disrespect to a court by word or conduct – are now regarded as a ‘disciplinary offence’187 
triable by the Disciplinary Board188 established by the Advocates Law,189 and headed by the 
Attorney-General.190 This position may have been brought about by the suggestion of the 
ECtHR in the Kyprianou case that punishing lawyers for contempt committed during their 
conduct of a client’s case in court could have a ‘chilling effect’ on the performance of 
lawyers in court. However, it is contended that the court was not advocating immunity for 
lawyers from ex facie contempt of court; rather, it was urging judicial restraint when 
considering a contempt case affecting a lawyer and in sentencing a contemnor lawyer in 
order to strike a fair balance between the need to protect the authority of the judiciary on 
the one hand and on the other hand the protection of the lawyer’s freedom of expression in 
his professional capacity.
From the foregoing, one can deduce two implications. First, the Nicosia Assize Court 
(and, indeed, other courts in Cyprus) is effectively powerless against anyone who commits 
contempt in the face of the court (ex facie contempt of court)–speciﬁ cally, where the act 
constituting the contempt ‘turns against the person of the judge of the said court’.191 
Although an affected court/judge has power under Article 44(3) of the Courts of Justice 
(Amend ment) Law 36 (1) 2009 to ‘refer the case and the relative proceedings to the President 
of the Supreme Court, in order for the latter to appoint another court to adjudicate the 
offence’, in the case of an Attorney-General it seems that such a reference is potentially 
ineffective as he could invoke his constitutional power to discontinue the case. Secondly, 
a deliberate act of disrespect by a lawyer (including the Attorney-General) who is conducting 
a case before a court does not constitute the offence of contempt of court but merely a 
disciplinary offence, which may be tried by a Board headed by the Attorney-General. All of 
this probably explains why Attorney-General Petros Clerides interfered with impunity with 
the reading of the judgment in the recent Efstathiou case.192 
186 Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(1)/2009, Article 44(9).
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Advocates Law, Cap 2 (as amended). The court before which the disrespect occurred may 
refer the matter to the Disciplinary Board, which is required to examine the conduct ‘as a matter of 
urgency’. See Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(1)/2009, Article 44(9).
190 There are six other members of the Board, apart from the Attorney-General. See Cyprus Bar 
Association, ‘The Board Members’ <http://www.cyprusbarassociation.org/
thebodymembers_en.php> (accessed 21 October 2009). 
191 See Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36(1)/2009), Article 44(3). See also generally Article 
44 (2)–(10).
192 It must be mentioned that though the Courts of Justice (Amendment) Law 36 (1) 2009) was 
passed shortly after the Efstathiou case was decided, it was never in doubt in Cyprus that the ECHR 
decision in the Kyprianou case effectively precluded the Nicosia Assize Court from taking any ac-
tion against the Attorney-General when he interfered with the reading of the judgment in the case. 
Furthermore, the conduct of the Attorney-General and other justice ofﬁ cials following the acquittal 
of the ten policemen charged with offences in the Efstathiou case has been condemned in an article 
in the CyprusMail. After recounting their various reactions and public statements, it was concluded: 
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Regrettably, while Law 36(1)/2009 may have been well-intentioned, it seems it has 
unwittingly added to the power of the Cypriot Attorney-General in a manner that may well 
be contrary to the rule of law and democracy. Prior to the amendment, a Cypriot Attorney-
General was an established powerful State ofﬁ cer193–the Attorney-General’s ofﬁ ce is an 
independent ofﬁ ce194 and the occupant enjoys security of tenure195 and salary196 (he cannot 
easily be removed from ofﬁ ce nor can his salary be reduced) unlike the case in some 
common wealth countries (such as Nigeria) where the Attorney-General’s ofﬁ ce is at the 
pleasure of the Head of Government. In the interests of justice, the rule of law and 
democracy, it is strongly recommended that the Cypriot government should consider 
amending the prosecutory and other laws appro priately to ensure that the prosecutor is not 
above the law nor have the sem blance of being above the law in any way, although it must 
be acknowledged that this may not be easily achieved within the complex Cypriot 
constitutional context.
The Cypriot judiciary has truly helped the country, even as recognized by the President 
of the Cyprus Bar Association Doros Ioannides. The celebrated Supreme Court of Cyprus 
decision in Attorney-General of Cyprus v. Mustapha Ibrahim,197 eloquently illustrates this 
point. That was the case where both Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges cooperated to render 
a decision which has helped to hold the fabric of the Cypriot society together on the doctrine 
of ‘state necessity’ since the 1964 inter-communal clashes led to the enduring problem of 
the country.198 More recently, the contribution of the Cypriot judiciary to the general 
interests of the citizenry can be seen in the landmark decision in the Orams case, which the 
European of Justice (ECJ) recently ruled to be binding and legally enforceable throughout 
  We have an Attorney-general [AG] who does not completely trust the justice system, a deputy 
AG who feels that judges get things wrong and a senior counsel who insists that many police ofﬁ cers 
are corrupt crooks. And these ofﬁ cials are supposed to work together with the allegedly corrupt police 
in order to prosecute suspected law-breakers? They are also supposed to cultivate respect for the law, 
the justice system and the state, but they are doing the exact opposite. How can they serve the very 
state in which they have so little faith and have gone out of their way to discredit? Only they could 
answer. See ‘What sort of example are our justice ofﬁ cials setting?’.
193 It is perhaps a measure of the degree of contempt with which the Attorney-General holds 
the Cypriot judiciary that he chose to reward a possible contemnor, Loukis Loucaides, with a fat 
brief–counsel for the State-Appellant in the Efstathiou case–instead of prosecuting him for con-
tempt of court as would have happened elsewhere. A commentator also thinks that the choice of 
Loucaides (former ECHR judge now in private legal practice) was wrong for other reasons. See 
Charalambous, L.: Of all the lawyers to appeal the beatings ruling, why Loucaides? [CyprusMail 
(Internet Edition), 10 May 2009].
194  Constitution of Cyprus 1960, Article 112(2). 
195  Constitution of Cyprus 1960, Article 112(4).
196  Constitution of Cyprus 1960, Article 166(1)(b). See further Article 153 (7)–(12).
197  Attorney-General of Cyprus v. Mustapha Ibrahim, Cyprus Law Reports, (1964) 195.
198  Following inter-communal clashes (Greek versus Turkish Cypriots) in 1963 and the at-
tempted military coup in 1974, Turkey had invaded and occupied the northern part of Cyprus since 
1974; thus effectively partitioning the small Island country (it is estimated that Turkey is occupying 
some 37% of the country: an area which the Turkish Cypriots now call Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, recognized only by the Republic of Turkey). Presently, there are discussions and negotia-
tions between the President of Cyprus and the political leader of the occupied part of Cyprus (Turk-
ish Cypriot leader) towards ﬁ nding a solution to the problem and ending the Turkish occupation 
(dubbed re-uniﬁ cation talks).
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the European Union.199 In that case, a Cypriot court had decided in favour of a Greek 
Cypriot who claimed title to land located in the Turkish occupied northern Cyprus on which 
a British couple had built a villa. 
The point must be made that without independence, no judiciary can satisfactorily 
play its important role in the society, not least the Cypriot judiciary. Yet, it was the case 
that the reactions and comments which followed the Efstathiou case decision greatly 
impinged on the independence of the judiciary as explained above. Among others, the 
reactions and comments grossly violated the prescriptions of Article 2 of the Universal 
Charter of the Judge 1999, which states that ‘the Judge, as a holder of judicial ofﬁ ce, must 
be able to exercise judicial powers free from social, economic and political pressure’, and 
Principle 1(d) of Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of 1994 (on the independence, efﬁ ciency 
and role of Judges) of the Council of Europe, which states, inter alia, that ‘judges should be 
independent and be able to act without any restriction, improper inﬂ uence, inducements, 
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason’. In 
the end, given the importance of the judiciary in any democratic society as shown above 
and having regard to the fact that it cannot properly function without independence and 
public conﬁ dence in it, nothing should be done that may destroy the independence of the 
Cypriot  judiciary in any way. 
Furthermore, lawyers must remember that their special status in the society gives them 
a central position in the administration of justice ‘as intermediaries between the public and 
the courts’, and that this position leads to restrictions on their conduct. So, while they, like 
other members of the society, can comment in public on the administration of justice, their 
criticism must not overstep certain bounds: it must not degrade the courts.200 In the Case of 
Schöpfer v. Switzerland,201 the ECtHR reiterated that ‘the courts–the guarantors of justice, 
whose role is fundamental in a State based on the rule of law–must enjoy public 
conﬁ dence…202 Regard being had to the key role of lawyers in this ﬁ eld, it is legitimate to 
expect them to contribute to the proper administration of justice, and thus to maintain public 
conﬁ dence therein’. Undoubtedly, the comments of most Cypriot lawyers (including the 
Attorney-General of Cyprus) regarding the decision in Efstathiou case undermined the 
public conﬁ dence in the judiciary instead of contributing thereto.203 In fact, as already 
suggested above, the statements of Loucaides and Attorney-General Petros Clerides 
199 See B. Waterﬁ eld, ‘Landmark court ruling means Britons could be forced to re-
turn homes in Northern Cyprus’  (Telegraph, 29 April 2009); available at: <http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/cyprus/5242294/Landmark-court-ruling-means-Britons-could-
be-forced-to-return-homes-in-Northern-Cyprus.html> (accessed 9 May 2009). See also S. Bahceli, 
‘Orams lose at Court of Justice’ [CyprusMail (Internet Edition), 29 April 2009], Although some, 
particularly Turkish Cypriots, contend that the Orams decision will complicate the ongoing re-
uniﬁ cation talks, Greek Cypriots are generally exhilarated by the decision. As at 20 October 2009, 
there is no evidence that that decision has caused any signiﬁ cant obstacle to the progress of the 
talks. 
200 See Case of Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, paras. 27 and 28.
201 Case of Schöpfer v. Switzerland, Judgment of 20 May 1998, Reports 1998-III, para. 29. See 
also Casado v. Spain, Judgment of 24 February 1994, Series A no. 285-A. See also Veraart v. The 
Netherlands (Application No. 10807/04), Judgment of 30 November 2006, para. 51; Case of Steur v. 
The Netherlands (Application no. 39657/98), Judgment of 23 October 2003, para. 38.
202 See also Case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, para. 34. 
203 See generally Citizens for Independent Courts, Uncertain Justice: Politics and America’s 
Courts (New York 2000), esp. at 149.
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amounted to scurrilous attack on the trial judges and the Cypriot judiciary ‘under the guise 
of criticism’.204
The media is equally important to the Cypriot society, as elsewhere in the world. In 
fact, neither the judiciary nor the media is more important than the other in a democratic 
society. Hence, what is needed is a thorough recognition of the limits of all institutions of 
government. Moreover, it must be noted that while freedom of speech is important in a 
democratic society, it is not an absolute right. It cannot be used, for instance, to peddle 
dirt in terms of defamatory statements or in terms of scurrilous abuse of the judicial system 
or to interfere with judicial proceedings. In the end, a ﬁ tting conclusion to this article is the 
following immortal words of Justice Frankfurter in the US Supreme Court in 1946:
Without a free press there can be no free society. Freedom of the press, however, is 
not an end, in itself, but a means to the end of a free society. The scope and nature of 
the constitutional protection of freedom of speech must be viewed in that light, and 
in that light applied. The independence of the judiciary is no less a means to the end 
of a free society, and the proper functioning of an independent judiciary puts the 
freedom of the press in its proper perspective. For the judiciary cannot function 
properly if what the press does is reasonably calculated to disturb the judicial 
judgment in its duty and capacity to act solely on the basis of what is before the 
court. A judiciary is not independent unless courts of justice are enabled to administer 
law by absence of pressure from without, whether exerted through the blandishments 
of reward or the menace of disfavour.205 
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potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. A free press is vital to a demo-
cratic society because its freedom gives it power. Power in a democracy implies responsibility in its 
exercise. No institution in a democracy, either governmental or private, can have absolute power. Nor 
can the limits of power which enforce responsibility be ﬁ nally determined by the limited power it-
self… In plain English, freedom carries with it responsibility even for the press; freedom of the press 
is not a freedom from responsibility for its exercise...These are generalities. But they are generalities 
of the most practical importance in achieving a proper adjustment between a free press and an inde-
pendent judiciary. Especially in the administration of the criminal law–that most awesome aspect of 
government–society needs independent courts of justice. This means judges free from control by the 
executive, free from all ties with political interests, free from all fears of reprisal or hopes of reward. 
The safety of society and the security of the innocent alike depend upon wise and impartial criminal 
justice. Misuse of its machinery may undermine the safety of the State; its misuse may deprive the 
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